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ABSTRACT:
Operational surprise attacks are large-scale, theater-level intrawar attacks, which
result from a country misestimating the capabilities and intentions of its enemies. This
thesis analyzes how these massive surprise attacks occur during war when countries
should be especially wary of their enemies and vigilant for any evidence of attack. Three
hypotheses may explain the frequency and success of operational surprise attacks
including operational secrecy, strategic deception, and intelligence failure. Using the
Battle of the Bulge in World War II and the Chinese counteroffensive in the Korean War
as case studies, this analysis illustrates these three elements and evaluates their relative
causal weight in these attacks.
This study concludes that each hypothesis is a contributing element to the surprise
attack, but that a failure of intelligence is the critical factor. Moreover, this failure stems
from a "victory disease" - a belief held by military leaders and their intelligence staff
when victory appears near that one's enemy is too weak or has allowed the opportunity to
mount a successful counterattack pass. Thus, precisely when one's enemy becomes most
desperate on the battlefield countries run a greater risk of surprise attack by failing to
accurately estimate an enemy's strategic intentions and military capabilities.
Thesis Supervisor: Barry Posen
Title: Ford International Professor of Political Science
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INTRODUCTION
Throughout history the issues of intelligence, deception, and surprise have been
the subject of discussion and analysis by military theorists, political scientists, and
policymakers. 1 Since the terrorist attack of 9/11 and the flawed intelligence estimates on
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD), there has been a renaissance in government
commissions, official reports, and scholarly articles focused on the flaws in the American
intelligence system which include corrective policy prescriptions.2 While contemporary
studies of intelligence concentrate on specific intelligence failures, much of the older
literature examines the issues of strategic warning and surprise, undoubtedly motivated
by the experience of the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor during World War II
and the fear of a Soviet surprise attack during the Cold War.3 Largely overlooked in
writings on intelligence, however, is the issue of operational surprise.4 Operational
surprises are large-scale intrawar attacks that occur at the theater level between two or
more warring countries.
Nestled between strategic surprise and tactical surprise, operational surprises
cover a less-studied, but nevertheless vital niche of cases. To understand these varied
types of surprise it is important to juxtapose the nuances between the three types.5
t For examples, see the various works of Sun Tzu, Carl von Clausewitz, Niccolo Machiavelli, Barton
Whaley, Richard Betts, Michael Handel, John Lewis Gaddis, Jack Davis, etc.
2 See the 9/11 Commission Report http://www.9-l commission.gov/report/index.htm;
Iraqi WMD report http://www.wmd.gov/report/; and the National Counterintelligence Strategy
http://www.ncix.gov/publications/lawpolicy/policy/FinalCIStrategyforWebMarch21 .pdf.
3 See for example, the discussion on "signal to noise ratio" in Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning
and Decision (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press; 1962).
4 One exception is Barton Whaley's work Strategem: Deception and Surprise in War (Cambridge: MA,
Center for International Studies; 1969). However, this work focuses on simple statistical measures of
cases.
5 Soviet military science uses terms for each of the levels of operation from tactical to grand strategy, in
particular note operativnoe iskustvo (operational art), as opposed to strategiya (strategic) and taktika
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Strategic surprise is widely considered to be the surprise that occurs at the outset of
hostilities between two warring countries at the national level. Typically, the surprised
country experiences increased political tension with the attacker but believes that an
attack, whether preventive or preemptive6 , is only a distant possibility. Frequently, the
leadership of the surprised country believes that it will be able to resolve the situation
with diplomacy or at least delay hostilities while it reinforces its defenses. Some classic
examples of strategic surprise from World War II include the German invasion of the
Soviet Union, and the Japanese attack against Pearl Harbor. Of course, many other
modem wars (e.g. the Korean War, the Six Day's War, the Yom Kippur War, etc.) were
launched when one country attempted to attain its political objectives through a strategic
surprise attack.
Tactical surprise, on the other extreme, is surprise achieved at the unit level
during the outset of an attack. Most, but not all, battles begin with the units of one
country attempting to achieve surprise in order to reduce the advantages accruing to their
enemy from fighting from prepared defensive positions. While examples of tactical
surprise abound, one good example is the German glider attack on the Belgian fort Eben
Emael in 1940.7 In this attack a small German force landed on the roof, used shaped
charges to destroy the artillery casements, and captured the 750-man garrison. Even
(tactical). Barton Whaley, Strategem: Deception and Surprise in War (Cambridge: MA, Center for
International Studies; 1969), 246.
6 For more discussion of the difference between preventive and preemptive see Thomas Schelling, Arms
and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press; 1966), 224-230, 249-250, and 269.
7 Apparently, the Dutch commander did issue an alert to his forces on the German border just before the
attack of May 10, 1940, but the warning was not communicated to all units behind the line because action
was not immediately expected in interior sectors. As a result, the two German airborne divisions that
landed in the Fortress Holland area came up against troops that had not been alerted, in the interest of
avoiding needless fatigue. No more than a company of 85 German troops in gliders captured the vital
fortress of Eben Emael in Belgium, which had a garrison of at least 750. Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack:
Lessonsfor Defense Planning (Washington, D.C.: Brookings; 1982), 114.
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though this mission helped clear the way for German columns to advance through
Belgium into France, neither its success nor failure would have had major strategic
implications for the war.
While strategic, operational and tactical surprise share the factors of location and
timing, operational surprise lies between these two extremes regarding the scale of the
operation.8 Operational surprises occur at the theater and campaign level (versus the
national or tactical levels) and between at least two countries already engaged in
hostilities. It is nearly impossible to classify an attack simply by using numbers.
However, to get some idea of the difference in scale, operational surprise require armies
or army groups rather than companies or battalions and hundreds of square miles instead
of an attack against a particular target such as a unit or village.
Oftentimes an operational surprise attack is so large it has a significant impact on
the course of the war - whether it succeeds or because it fails.9 For example,
MacArthur's surprise attack at Inchon in the Korean War reversed the direction of the
war and sent the North Korean forces reeling back north of the 38t h parallel in defeat.
When this sort of attack succeeds, the winning side may destroy the enemy's force or
ability to wage war or at the least achieve important strategic goals (e.g. strategic terrain,
natural resources, or manufacturing facilities). On the other hand if an operational
8 Two other factors commonly analyzed in surprise attacks are mass and method. Both strategic and
operational share the characteristic of mass - typically substantial amounts of men and material at the
Corps or Army Group level of operations. A surprise of method, however, utilizes a novel means of
executing the attack. One such example is the German use of blitzkrieg tactics during World War II. This
analysis focuses on the operational aspects of timing, location, and mass.
9 This paper focuses on operational surprise by an attacker, however, operational surprise may also be
achieved on the defense (e.g. the Japanese method of defense on Okinawa). I am grateful to Robert
Vickers for pointing out this distinction.
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surprise attack should fail, the attacker may either fatally deplete its forces or allow a
weakened enemy time to recover.
In some cases, a country which perceives itself to be losing the war will husband
its resources and lash out in a last ditch effort to bring its adversary to the bargaining
table or to increase its leverage if diplomatic talks are ongoing. For example, many
military historians believe that this was Hitler's goal late in World War II, when he
conceived of and initiated the attack in the Ardennes region that came to be known as the
Battle of the Bulge. If successful, the attack might have caused a rift between the allies
and allowed the Wehrmacht breathing room to focus its forces against the Soviet armies
on the Eastern Front. As it happened, however, the U.S. and Britain were able to contain
and eventually rollback the "Bulge." The Wehrmacht's resulting loss of 30 divisions
undoubtedly weakened its ability to mount a strong defense on either front or, ultimately,
prevent allied forces from capturing Berlin.
More important than factors such as the location, timing, or magnitude of the
operation, however, are the estimates of an enemy's capabilities and intentions.
Operational surprise attacks are egregious intelligence failures because preparations for
the attack are not detected, the intentions of the attacker are not accurately assessed, or
the defender discounts the enemy's capabilities to even launch such an attack.
Admittedly, it is rare that countries experience an unexpected "bolt from the blue" attack.
Despite this, one can understand how the trauma of such an event could drive scholars to
examine the issue of strategic warning. What is less easy to understand is how so little
theoretical attention has been paid to surprises that occurs at the theater level between
countries already engaged in military combat.
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Countries should expect their enemies to utilize whatever means at their disposal
to gain an advantage - particularly surprise attacks. Since the advent of the mass army
and industrialization this has frequently been accomplished by crushing one's enemy
under a superior weight of men and material. Indeed, often tallying the population of
military age, the population's growth, a country's natural resources and production
capabilities is sufficient to predict which country between two is likely to triumph. This
is particularly true (but not always) when one country is at substantially better endowed
than its opponent. Despite the importance of relative economic position and population
dynamics, deception and surprise remain useful tools for increasing both the efficacy of
an operation as well as its likelihood of success.
Since countries at war should expect surprise attacks and have focused their
intelligence collection, analysis and warning resources on their enemies, how is it that
countries are surprised at the operational level? Do the Clausewitzian factors of "fog of
war" and battlefield "friction" simply blind a country to its foe's actions and inhibit its
ability to respond? Are deception operations so effective that countries are consistently
able to obscure their actions and surprise their enemies? Instead perhaps countries blind
themselves to their enemies' true capabilities and thus fail to adequately prepare
themselves for defense or react in a timely manner to surprise attacks? The answer seems
to be a combination of each of these factors, but particularly the failure of intelligence.'l
10 The success of a surprise attack might be considered by some to be defacto evidence of an intelligence
failure, regardless of an enemy's operational security or strategic deceptions. This perspective holds
intelligence to a very high standard indeed. Instead, it is rational to expect intelligence officers to make
"best efforts" to collect information and provide "competent, reasonable" analysis. Eliot Cohen and John
Gooch put this best on their book on military failures when they assert, "At its best, intelligence can
provide the bounds for strategic calculation, but it is asking too much to expect it to look into the future."
In other words, intelligence is useful for providing estimates of an enemy's intentions and capabilities, but
cannot be expected to foretell the precise future operations of the enemy. Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch,
Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War (New York: Vintage Books; 1990), 43.
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Furthermore, it is interesting to note that operational surprises tend to occur when the
losing side makes a major effort to reverse a deteriorating military situation. Thus, the
surprised country underestimates the enemy's national will, strategic intentions, and
remaining military capabilities, and is unprepared to counter or contain the threat.
This analysis has already identified the four main factors that contribute to
operational surprise - location, timing, scale, and the defender's estimates of an enemy's
capabilities and intentions. In order to increase the effectiveness of the attack it is
important to maximize the degree of surprise in each of these variables. Obviously, it is
better to attack where the enemy is least prepared, when the enemy does not expect it,
and with forces the enemy has not identified in one's order of battle. To accomplish this
there are many intelligence and operational tools that are frequently employed. Each of
these efforts hinge, however, on counterintelligence, operational security, and deception.
For example, during World War II both the Allies and the Germans employed a wide
range of deceptions to achieve the elements of surprise. These efforts included
maintaining high operational security, limiting enemy reconnaissance, transmitting fake
wireless signal traffic, building dummy vehicles and decoy units, appointing military
leaders over non-existent armies, running spies and double agents, creating false
operational plans, and launching feints or demonstrations against other sectors. Since
that time, both the technical and physical means of deception have evolved but the
ultimate objective of blinding an enemy to one's capabilities and intentions has remained
unchanged.
To better understand operational surprise, this thesis first examines the literature
that discusses deception, intelligence and surprise. From Sun Tzu and Clausewitz to
10
Richard Betts and Barton Whaley, the importance of deception and intelligence to
attaining tactical and strategic surprise has been analyzed and debated. Chapter One
summarizes the evolution of these writings and infers theoretical hypotheses on the
factors of operational surprise to be tested in the subsequent case studies. Chapters Two
and Three comprise two case studies where significant operational surprises with
important strategic implications were inflicted against superior American forces since
World War II.
Chapter Two analyzes the Battle of the Bulge - an archetype of operational
surprise attack that occurred in the waning months of World War II on the Western Front
between the Allied Expeditionary Force and the German forces. Were allied forces
blinded to German intentions and preparations by the "friction" of war or German
deception operations? Or did allied commanders and intelligence officers believe that the
Germans were so beaten that they could not mount an effective counterattack much less a
counteroffensive?
The other case study examines the Chinese counteroffensive across the Yalu
River during the Korean War. It should be noted that many political scientists and
policymakers consider this a case of strategic surprise attack rather than operational
surprise. Admittedly, the Chinese did become a new entrant into the Korean conflict
with their strike across the Yalu. However, the United States and the UN forces had been
engaged in major military engagements for five months. Moreover, the Chinese had
publicly warned the international community that they would not allow UN forces to
" Whaley classifies both the Battle of the Bulge and the Chinese counteroffensive across the Yalu in the
same category (strategic), but draws no distinction between surprises that occur at the beginning of a war
and those that occur during a war. Barton Whaley, Strategem: Deception and Surprise in War (Cambridge:
MA, Center for International Studies; 1969), B-10 - B-23.
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approach the Yalu and critical hydroelectric plants in North Korea without response.
Why then did American and United Nations (UN) forces fail to predict the Chinese
intervention on behalf of the North Korean communist forces? Again, were the
operations and deceptions of the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) so effective that
Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP) and the UN forces
were hoodwinked? Or did the intelligence and military leadership fail to adequately
evaluate the possibility of a Chinese attack and accurate estimates of troop strength and
intentions which resulted in the operational surprise attack and the political stalemate on
the peninsula that continues to this day.
Although, operational surprises occur regularly in war, these cases were selected
to evaluate the relative explanatory power of operational secrecy, strategic deception and
intelligence failure on operational surprise attacks against the United States. These
instances of surprise attack allow a test of how a weaker opponent was able to achieve
operational surprise against a superior opponent, the United States. One might assume
that countries near to victory would have advantages for both detecting preparations for
surprise attacks and blunting their effects. Nevertheless, weaker countries manage to
inflict these surprise attacks on their enemies sporadically throughout the 20th century.
As Betts notes
The importance of surprise for an attacker varies inversely with his
advantage in forces or the risks he faces from the victim's retaliation.
Surprise is almost superfluous if the attacker dwarfs the opponent (as
when the Germans swallowed Poland in 1939), but it is vital if opposing
forces are evenly matched (as in the invasion of France a year later).
Shock is the only hope at all if the victim is stronger than the attacker (as
the Israelis were vis-A-vis the Arabs in 1973).12
12 Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack: Lessonsfor Defense Planning (Washington, D.C.: Brookings; 1982),
6.
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Thus, when a country is losing the war, a surprise attack may seem to be the best option.
Paradoxically, this occurs exactly when the country winning the war runs the greatest
risks of being attacked, is most predisposed to dismiss intelligence warnings, and
typically incorrectly estimates its enemies intentions and remaining capabilities.
Each of these surprise attacks were carried out against the military of the United
States at times when it enjoyed comparable, if not superior, intelligence, logistics, and
technology (but not necessarily troop strength) and still suffered enormous losses and
setbacks. Because the United States is the sole remaining superpower, it is likely that it
may find itself in similar positions in the future. If, as this study argues, operational
surprise attacks are the result of intelligence failures rather than an enemy's secrecy and
deception operations, than the military of the United States would do well to learn from
mistakes of its past hubris. Finally, the robust historical accounts of the Battle of the
Bulge and the Chinese counterattack provide ample sources for considering the factors
that affect the success of the operational surprise attack.
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CHAPTER I
DECEPTION, SURPRISE AND INTELLIGENCE
If we always knew the enemy's intentions beforehand, we should always,
even with inferior forces, be superior to him.
- Frederick the Great'3
The Advantage of Surprise
The myriad advantages of surprise have been obvious to the practitioners of war
for millennia. All things being equal, a surprise attack is simply more likely to succeed.
By catching an unsuspecting enemy off guard before he can assemble his forces or
prepare his defenses, one is more likely to be able to bring a superior weight of men and
material to the decisive point in the battle. While often difficult to achieve, surprise is the
most effective force multiplier and often critical to the success or failure of an operation.
Richard Betts notes that
Increments of forces provide an arithmetical advantage, but the effects of
successful shock are geometrical. Surprise is a force multiplier. It can
neutralize much of the victim's defense by enveloping or destroying forces
at the outset. Surprise can also keep the victim reeling when his plans
dictate that he should be reacting, and it prevents him from using his
capabilities efficiently while the attacker exploits his own to the
maximum. ' 4
Similarly, one military analyst, after comparing the combat effectiveness where surprise
was achieved and where it was not, concluded that "the combat capability of the side
13 Frederick the Great as quoted in Colmar Von der Goltz in The Nation in Arms (London: Hugh Rees;
1913), 198.
'4 Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning (Washington, D.C.: Brookings; 1982),
5.
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achieving surprise was - on the average - almost doubled." 5 Another estimated that the
effect of surprise changes the ratio of casualties in favor of the attacker from 1:1 to about
5:1.16 Regardless of how great the accruing advantage, it is clear that achieving surprise
has been a key strategy from ancient times to the present.
Surprise, however, is rarely achieved without deception and almost never without
an intelligence failure.17 Michael Handel asserts that "deception and surprise are closely
related, as deception provides one of the most effective ways to achieve surprise.
Surprise and deception in turn can presumably be avoided or prevented by timely,
reliable intelligence."'8 Thus, one may think of deception and intelligence as opposite
sides of the same coin. While utilizing deception to achieve surprise, however, it is
essential to use intelligence to prevent oneself from being deceived and surprised in turn.
This chapter focuses on the development of the surprise attack as a basic tenet of
warfare during ancient, Napoleonic and modern times. By examining the writings of Sun
Tzu, Clausewitz, and a handful of modern theorists it is possible to trace the waxing and
waning of the popularity of deception operations and efforts to achieve the effect of
surprise. In particular, it is interesting that the trench warfare experience of World War I
on the Western Front seems to have influenced the perception of both military theorists
and commanders of the utility of surprise attack. Moreover, most modern theorists have
only considered the importance of strategic surprise, while overlooking cases of
15 Colonel Trevor N. Depuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-israeli Wars, 1947-1874 (Harper and Row, 1978),
5.96
16 Barton Whaley, Strategem: Deception and Surprise in War (Cambridge: MIT, Center for International
Studies; 1969), 193.
17 Richard K. Betts notes that "If the victim fails to obtain warning, surprise occurs. If he obtains warning
but does not respond to it, he still suffers the effects of surprise." Betts, Surprise Attack: Lessons for
Defense Planning (Washington, D.C.: Brookings; 1982), 5.
18 Michael Handel. Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought (London: Frank Cass; 1992, 2002), 215.
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operational surprise and their implications for the future conduct of war. Operational
surprise attacks during war may be just as important as strategic surprise attack for
suddenly changing the relative balance of military, and even political power, between
rival states. For example, the successful Israeli counterattack across the Suez Canal in
the 1973 War was an inflection point for the course of that conflict. By examining
surprise attacks in these circumstances it is possible to understand both when and why
they are likely to occur and how to minimize their impact and effectiveness.
Sun Tzu and Surprise
Although achieving surprise has been critical from ancient times to the present,
the way in which military theorists and analysts have considered the issue and the way in
which generals have sought to exploit it has evolved substantially over that time. For
example, the ancient military theorist, Sun Tzu, writes about surprise much differently
than Carl von Clausewitz, the Prussian theorist of the 1800's. Sun Tzu fetishizes the art
of deception in achieving surprise and victory while Clausewitz largely dismisses
deception and surprise as distractions from his perspective on waging war.
Sun Tzu's writings focus on an earlier time, when surprise was deemed even
more critical than in modern war. Because there was relatively little difference in the
weapons or tactics between warring states, deception and surprise were often crucial
factors for achieving the local battlefield superiority necessary for victory when
deploying forces larger than the enemy was not an option. The responsibility for
devising and executing such stratagems was primarily left to the military commander.' 9
'9 Michael Handel. Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought (London: Frank Cass; 1992, 2002), 216.
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Due to the relatively small size of the forces and the highly tactical nature of most
premodern military engagements, it remained possible for a single individual to both
contrive and render deceptions without having the support of a general staff or
intelligence apparatus.
Throughout The Art of War, the esteem with which Sun Tzu holds deception and
surprise is obvious. Sun Tzu asserts that "all warfare is based on deception"20 and
encourages military leaders to use surprise to "attack where [the enemy] is unprepared:
[and to] sally out when he does not expect you."2 1 He applies these prescriptions
expansively to the subject of war, addressing tactical, operational, strategic and political
aspects. Similarly, Sun Tzu's definition of deception is also quite broad, including "both
active and passive measures, from elaborate deception plans, simple baits, and diversion,
to secrecy and concealment." 22 Each of these prescriptions was based on obtaining
timely accurate intelligence, and he counsels his reader to "know the enemy, know
yourself; [and] your victory will never be endangered." 2 3 Nor was Sun Tzu the only
military theoretician to value deception. In his Discourses, Machiavelli writes that "nor
do I believe that force alone will be enough, but fraud alone will be enough." 2 4 From
these writings it is possible to see how important deception and surprise were for military
engagements. 25
20 Sun Tzu, The .Art of War. trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press; 1971), 66.
21 Sun Tzu, The Art of War. trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press; 1971), 69.
22 Michael Handel. Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought. (London: Frank Cass; 1992, 2002), 217.
23 Sun Tzu, The Art of War. trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press; 1971), 129.
24 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Discourses, ed. Bernard Crick, trans. Leslie J. Walker (London: Penguin
Books; 1970, 1983), 310.
25 For examples, see also Thucydides, Frontinus, Caesar, Machiavelli, etc.
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Clausewitz Overlooks Surprise
Curiously, Carl von Clausewitz, who wrote On War in the early 19th century, is
much less concerned with deception, surprise, or intelligence. In part, this stems from his
greater focus on the strategic levels of the campaign, and his analysis rarely strays into
tactical or operational aspects. This lack of attention may also be attributed to the fact
that in the age of mass armies, mass mobilization, and large-scale battles, strategic
surprise was quite difficult to achieve. Still, the degree to which Clausewitz discounts
deception and intelligence is remarkable. His negative views contradict Sun Tzu's at
least on the operational level and are worth quoting at some length; Clausewitz writes:
While the wish to achieve surprise is common and, indeed, indispensable,
and while it is true that it will never be completely ineffective, it is equally
true that by its very nature surprise can rarely be outstandingly successful.
It would be a mistake, therefore, to regard surprise as a key element of
success in war. The principle is highly attractive in theory, but in practice
it is often held up by the friction of the whole machine.
Basically, surprise is a tactical device, simply because in tactics, time and
space are limited in scale. Therefore in strategy surprise becomes more
feasible the closer it occurs to the tactical realm, and more difficult, the
more it approaches the higher levels of policy.
Preparations for war usually take months. Concentrating troops at their
main assembly points generally requires the installation of supply dumps
and depots, as well as considerable troop movements, whose purpose can
be guessed soon enough.
It is very rare therefore that one state surprises another, either by attack or
by preparations for war... Cases in which such surprises lead to major
results are very rare. From this we may conclude how considerable are the
inherent difficulties. 26
26 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton
University Press; 1976), 198-199.
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Underlying this perspective was his belief that achieving a local superiority of men and
firepower was necessary for winning. Clausewitz believed, however, this was best
accomplished through tactical maneuvers and superior generalship, rather than surprise.
Moreover, while Clausewitz felt that surprise was a positive force to be achieved
if possible, he had little use for tactical deception. Again he was generally considering
the strategic level of operations and felt that deception "should not be considered as a
significant independent field action at the disposal of the commander."27 At the tactical
and operational levels, deception is both less certain of success and less effective if
successful. Clausewitz further denigrates the use of deception when he asserts
To prepare a sham action with sufficient thoroughness to impress an
enemy requires a considerable expenditure of time and effort, and the
costs increase with the scale of the deception. Normally they call for more
than can be spared, and consequently so-called strategic feints rarely have
the desired effect. It is dangerous, in fact, to use substantial forces over
any length of time merely to create an illusion; there is always the risk that
nothing will be gained and that the troops deployed will not be available
when they are needed.28
During Clausewitz' time, diversions were largely accomplished by moving troops around
the battlefield and potentially away from the decisive point, inevitably weakening any
attack. Thus, it is understandable that Clausewitz would prefer to utilize troops for
fighting in battle than marching them around hoping to deceive the enemy. However,
times have changed and deception operations have become more effective.
Clausewitz also does not hold intelligence in high regard. While he implicitly
credits intelligence for preventing countries from being able to mobilize in secret or
27 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton
University Press; 1976), 202-203.
28 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton
University Press; 1976; 1976), 203.
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execute strategic surprise attacks, Clausewitz does not believe that battlefield intelligence
is particularly useful for military leadership. He laments that
A general in time of war is constantly bombarded by reports both true and
false; by errors arising from fear or negligence or hastiness; by
disobedience born of right or wrong interpretations, of ill will, of a proper
or mistaken sense of duty; of laziness; or of exhaustion; and by accident
that nobody could have foreseen. In short, he is exposed to countless
impressions, most of them disturbing, few of them encouraging... If a man
were l:o yield to these pressures, he would never complete an operation. 29
Clausewitz believes that since war is chaotic and ever-changing, a commander's greatest
strength is his intuition and ability to take advantage of opportunities as they arise.
Perhaps it was the lack of real-time communication on the battlefield during the
Napoleonic Era reduced the value of intelligence for Clausewitz. Clausewitz asserts that
If we consider the actual basis of this information [i.e. intelligence], how
unreliable and transient it is, we soon realize that war is a flimsy structure
that can easily collapse and bury us in its ruins... Many intelligence reports
in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain.
This is true of all intelligence but even more so in the heat of battle, where
such reports tend to contradict and cancel each other out. In short, most
intelligence is false, and the effect of fear is to multiply lies and
inaccuracies. 30
He further notes that "the only situation a commander can know fully is his own: his
opponent's he can know only from unreliable intelligence." 31 Instead of intelligence,
Clausewitz believes that a good general should intuitively understand the objectives of
his enemy and from this derive his enemies' plans for achieving them. Admittedly, war
is both uncertain and fluid, however, modern military commanders rely heavily upon
many sources of intelligence to understand their enemy's intentions and capabilities.
29 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton
University Press; 1976), 193.
30 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton
University Press; 1976), 117.
31 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton
University Press; 1976), 84.
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Surprise post- World War I
While generals throughout the last century have continued to follow Clausewitz'
dictum of attempting to achieve local superiority on the battlefield, they have come to
rely upon deception, surprise and intelligence to achieve superiority for themselves and
deny it to their enemies. During World War I advancements in military technology such
as barbed wire protected trench networks, machine guns and high explosive artillery
shells as well as new strategies (e.g. defense in depth) made attempts to achieve
superiority and breakthroughs nearly impossible. In fact, Whaley's study of this subject
revealed that 25 out of 26 major battles that occurred during World War I possessed
neither elements of surprise nor deception.32 Later, in the years between the two World
War, the German General Waldemar Erfurth wrote that
Absolute superiority everywhere is unattainable; hence it must frequently
be replaced by relative superiority somewhere... Since relative superiority
will hardly be accomplished if the enemy knows the plan of concentration
before the hour of attack, the principle of surprise is of importance equal
to that of the principle of concentration. To defeat the enemy, he must be
attacked with superior numbers at the decisive point; but to possess
superior numbers at the point of attack, the enemy must be surprised.33
From Erfurth"s commentary and the revival in World War II of deception efforts and
surprise attacks it is clear that the combatants on all sides were pursuing strategies to
avoid another trench warfare stalemate. Moreover, the changing roles of strategic and
tactical intelligence and the ability to obtain information in real time meant that
operations had to be shielded in secrecy and protected by elaborate deception campaigns.
32 Barton Whaley, Strategem: Deception and Surprise in War (MIT, Center for International Studies,
1969), B-38.
33 General Waldemar Erfurth, Surprise, trans. Dr. Stefan T. Possony and Daniel Vilfroy (Harrisburg, PA:
Military Service Publishing Company; 1943), 40. Italics are his.
21
The Theory of Surprise Today
In more recent times, political scientists and policymakers have attempted to
further advance the understanding of surprise attacks first explicated by Sun Tzu,
Clausewitz and others. The vast majority, however, have written only on the subject of
strategic surprise. After World War II, western theorists and were still recovering from
the shock of the Japanese surprise attack at Pearl Harbor. During the Cold War, theorists
were undoubtedly motivated by the fear of a Soviet surprise nuclear or conventional
attack in West Germany. Additionally, the surprise attack by the Arabs against Israel in
the 1973 war highlighted the continued relevance of this topic. The majority of these
scholars, however, study strategic surprise and its implications for sudden changes to the
strategic balance of forces and early war termination. In general, these authors argued for
faster, more accurate intelligence analysis, the facilitation of communication both within
and between commands and political leadership, as well as better preparation in order to
respond to surprise attacks immediately. Others have written on the related issues of
perception, misperception, and psychology in decision-making.
The subject of operational surprise in war, however, has received scant attention.
Most authors seem to believe that only strategic surprises are likely to change the course
of the conflict and are therefore more worthy of study than operational surprises. Only
Michael Handel and Barton Whaley have written on the subject of operational surprise -
Handel only tangentially in his work on deception operations and intelligence. Whaley's
manuscript, "Strategem: Deception and Surprise in War", describes selected battles from
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1914 (World War I) to 1968 (the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia) and mines them for
general conclusions about deception and surprise.34
From Whaley's "Strategem" the reader can derive several noteworthy conclusions
that reinforce the importance of studying the niche of cases that comprise operational
surprise.3 5 hi his work, Whaley compared 68 instances of strategic surprise and/or
strategic deception and 47 examples of tactical surprise or deception and no major
differences were found.36 In other words, surprise attacks, whether they are strategic,
operational or tactical all share important characteristics. Thus, political scientists should
not so readily dismiss the importance of studying operational surprise. This is
particularly true since operational surprises may have a significant impact on the course
of a conflict and often hasten war towards a conclusion. One example of this
phenomenon, is the Israeli counterattack against the Egyptians in the 1973 war.
Whaley also argues that operational security plays little role in achieving surprise,
instead attributing success largely to deception stratagems.3 7 Indeed, he notes the high
correlation between deception and surprise when he notes that 73% of the strategic
surprises in his study displayed both elements, leaving the remaining 27% featuring
either deception or surprise but not both.3 8 Lastly, he analyzes five factors of surprise
34 Whaley admits that the use of "selected" examples do not meet the fundamental statistic requirement of
randomness.
35 It should be noted that Whaley makes no distinction between operational and strategic surprise or
between surprise at the start of hostilities or one that occurs while it is ongoing. He defines tactical to
include smaller unit operations from squads to divisions and strategic to include an entire campaign as
fought on a front (by a corps, army, or army group) or in a theater up to overall war policy. Barton Whaley,
"Strategem: Deception and Surprise in War" (MIT, Center for International Studies, 1969), 245.
36 Barton Whaley, Strategem: Deception and Surprise in War (MIT, Center for International Studies,
1969), v.
37 Barton Whaley, Strategem: Deception and Surprise in War (MIT, Center for International Studies,
1969), 1-2.
38 Barton Whaley, Strategem: Deception and Surprise in War (MIT, Center for International Studies,
1969), 163.
23
and concludes that in roughly 75% of the cases the enemy was surprised by time and
place, 60% by the strength of the attack, 45% by the intentions of the enemy, and 16% by
the method of the attack.39 Thus, in cases where surprise succeeds, more often than not,
one typically knows both the intentions and means of the enemy's attack but not its
location or timing.
The Importance of Operational Surprise
One aspect of surprise attacks that has received scant attention from Whaley or
other scholars is the issue of the operational surprise attack - the large-scale surprise
attacks that occur during wars. It is curious that a country fighting a war and ostensibly
focused on its enemies' intentions and capabilities could neglect their defenses, suffer
from deception, and be badly surprised. It is clear that high operational security,
elaborate strategic deception operations, and intelligence failures each contribute to the
success of operational surprise attacks. Do these elements contribute equally to
operational surprise or does one factor have more relative causal weight?
While: secrecy and deception are important, the failure of intelligence to provide
accurate and timely estimates of an enemy's capabilities and intentions is the vital
element enabling operational surprise attacks to succeed.40 Surprisingly, it is most often
these self-induced intelligence failures and not enemy deception efforts that permit the
execution of operational attacks. Despite high operational security and elaborate
39 Barton Whaley, Strategem: Deception and Surprise in War (MIT, Center for International Studies,
1969), 215.
40 The subsequent case studies support this conclusion, however, it should be noted some exceptions exist.
For example, the success of Operation Overlord, the amphibious landing on the Normandy beach in World
War II, can be attributed largely to the deception operation unleashed against the Germans by the Allies.
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deceptions stratagems, always exists providing indication of an attack. What is more
shocking is that the scant information that is collected during these situations is ignored
or explained away. Little effort is made to reconcile obvious discrepancies or even to
seek additional intelligence that could confirm or refute the possibility of an enemy
attack. More often than not, the weaker or losing side turns to the gambit of an
operational surprise attack in an attempt to reverse their declining position. Betts notes
this odd paradox that "while the victim assumes that attacking would create new
problems for the enemy, that enemy may gamble that an attack could solve or avert new
problems."4 ' In other words, precisely when one country is winning the war it becomes
less concerned with a surprise attack that is more likely to happen.
One may wonder how a country allows itself to grow complacent and suffer an
enemy's surprise attack? Perhaps the military intelligence simply lacks the appropriate
resources (e.g. planes, satellites, skilled analysts, etc.) to estimate the intentions and
capabilities and of their enemy. Do psychological factors or perhaps hubris in a country's
superior warfighting capability erode its concern for enemy operations? Admittedly, a
scarcity of intelligence collection resources could limit the area of coverage and the
amount of intelligence collected.
Richard Heuer provides an alternate psychological explanation when he writes
that
Alertness to the possibility of deception can influence the degree of one's
openness to new information, but not necessarily in a desirable direction.
The impetus for changing one's estimate of the situation can only come
from the recognition of an incompatibility between a present estimate and
some new evidence. If people can explain new evidence to their own
satisfaction with little change in their existing beliefs, they will rarely feel
41 Richard Betts., Surprise Attack: Lessonsfor Defense Planning (Washington, D.C.: Brookings; 1982),
132.
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the need for drastic revision of these beliefs. Deception provides a readily
'available' explanation for discrepant evidence: if the evidence does not fit
one's preconceptions, it may be dismissed as deception. Further, the more
alert or suspicious one is of deception, the more readily available this
explanation. Alertness to deception also leads the analyst to be more
skeptical of all the evidence, and to the extent that evidence is deemed
unreliable, the analyst's preconceptions must play a greater role in
determining which evidence to believe. This leads to a paradox: The more
alert we are to deception, the more likely we are to be deceived.4 2
While this phenomenon almost certainly can and does occur, this reasoning is insufficient
to explain the frequency and success of operational surprise attacks. In some cases such
as Operation Overlord, the operational secrecy or strategic deception might be so
effective that the enemy will be successfully deceived. In other cases like the Battle of
the Bulge, the veil of secrecy and deception may be partially pierced by the victim but yet
the enemy discounts this intelligence because it overestimates its enemy's helplessness.
The primary condition that allows a military to become complacent, however, is
the belief that the war is nearly won and that its enemy has lost the resources or
opportunity to successfully achieve a major reversal of fortune. This reasoning makes it
easy to dismiss any contrary evidence (e.g. intelligence of a buildup) and lulls
commanders into a false sense of confidence and security. Unfortunately, in this
situation commanders tend to run risks with the disposition of their units that often
increases the effectiveness of the attack.
42 Richard J. Heuer, "Strategic Deception: A Psychological Perspective", International Studies Quarterly,
Vol. 25 (June 1981), 294-327.
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CHAPTER II
The Battle of the Bulge:
A Failure of Allied Expectations
The weaker the forces that are at the disposal of the supreme commander,
the more appealing the use of cunning becomes. In a state of weakness
and insignificance, when prudence, judgment and ability no longer suffice,
cunning may well appear the only hope. The bleaker the situation, with
everything concentrating on a single desperate attempt, the more readily
cunning is joined to daring. Released from all future considerations, and
liberated from thoughts of later retribution, boldness and cunning will be
free to augment each other to the point of concentrating a faint glimmer of
hope onto a single beam of light which may yet kindle a flame.
- Carl Von Clausewitz, On War4 3
Hitler's Last Gambit: Surprise Attack through the Ardennes
In 1944, the Wehrmacht had been steadily pushed out of France and back into
Germany following the successful Allied landing and subsequent breakout operations
from the beaches of French Normandy. By the middle of August the Allied armies
controlled nearly all of France, Belgium and Luxembourg and stood only 50 miles from
the Ruhr, the industrial base of the Third Reich. The Allied strategic bombing campaign
was strangling German petroleum production. It was apparent that the once mighty
German war machine was taking a drubbing on both the Eastern and Western fronts.
Despite these problems, the military of the Third Reich was still making the Allied forces
pay dearly for every kilometer. A premature attempt by the Allies to capture canals and
bridges in the Netherlands (Operation Market Garden) to facilitate the invasion into the
German homeland failed. Afterwards, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary
43 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton
University Press; 1976), 203.
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Force (SHAEF) resigned itself to a slow, grinding effort against the German forces
manning the Siegfried Line and defenses around the Rhine. Another critical Allied goal
was to open Antwerp and other ports that the Allies could utilize instead of trucking
supplies all the way from Normandy to the front.
It was in this position of weakness that Hitler decided to launch his last great
gambit. After reviewing the deteriorating strategic situation in August, Hitler determined
that given sufficient time the situation could be saved. Despite losses of resources and
production centers, the German economy peaked in the fall of 1944 due to the
implementation of strict central management. Indeed, Germany was able to produce "a
record million and a quarter tons of ammunition, three-quarters of a million rifles, a
hundred thousand machine guns, and nine thousand artillery pieces."4 4 Moreover, the
Luftwaffe was beginning to deploy jet-propelled fighter and bomber airplanes that flew
three times faster than the current Allied airframes, but did not yet have sufficient
numbers to be tactically significant. The only decline was in the production of tanks, but
those numbers were partially offset by large numbers of self-propelled assault guns.
Lastly, the Third Reich still had nearly 10 million men in uniform, including 7.5 million
in its army.4 5 Thus, Hitler believed that he still had the capacity to force a stalemate and
allow the Third Reich to survive to fight another day but only if Germany continued to
hold the Ruhr.
On the Eastern Front, Hitler could afford to trade space for time. The Russians
had regained all the land lost during Operation Barbarossa up to the borders of East
Prussia. However, apart from the psychological damage of ceding portions of the
44 Charles MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets (New York: Perennial; 1985), 18.
45 Charles MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets (New York: Perennial; 1985), 18.
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German homeland to Stalin's communist armies the area contained little vital to the
German war effort. Hitler also knew that the Red Army's supply lines were stretched too
long and too thin to allow another offensive in the east before the spring. Nevertheless, a
German offensive in the east would surely have succumbed to the same factors that
defeated the first invasion - distance, cold weather, and the preponderance of Soviet men
and materiel.
On the Western Front the Allies faced the combined challenges of long supply
lines, defensive fortifications such as the Westwall (the German defensive position from
before the war also known as the Siegfried Line), and challenging terrain for maneuver
operations. Here the Allies did not yet have an overwhelming strength in numbers.
Additionally, because of Hitler's prescience in ordering diehard holdouts in both French
and Belgian ports the Allies had to transport all of their supplies and replacements from
the French coast. Finally, the distances to strategic targets for the Germans were not
insurmountably great. It was only 100 miles from the Ardennes region, a quiet sector of
the line, to Antwerp. Moreover, the Germans had successfully launched the German
invasion into France in 1940 from this very spot. Nevertheless, the difficult terrain
comprised of hills, valleys, rivers, and narrow roads, made large operations requiring
speed and maneuver difficult. And the cold, wet weather of the winter would quickly
turn roads into knee-deep mud or snow.
Despite these challenges, Hitler believed that a surprise armored thrust to
recapture Antwerp would deny the Allies a vital port, destroy or capture the American 1St
and 9 t h Armies around Aachen, as well as the British and Canadian armies in northern
Belgium. Furthermore, he reasoned that Britain would be hard-pressed to raise and equip
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another expeditionary force and Canada would be domestically unwilling to send
additional forces to their destruction. Hitler doubted that the United States would
continue to fight a European war single-handedly, particularly when the Third Reich
represented no threat to the United States. Thus, he hoped to split the Allies and
negotiate a separate peace and then throw his remaining forces against the Soviets to
destroy communism. Specifically, Hitler noted that
In the whole of world history there has never been a coalition which
consisted of such heterogeneous elements with such diametrically opposed
objectives...Ultracapitalist states on the one hand, ultra-Marxist states on
the other. On the one side a dying empire, that of Great Britain, and on
the other a 'colony,' the United States, anxious to take over the
inheritance...The Soviet Union is anxious to lay hands on the Balkans, the
Dardanelles, Persia and the Persian Gulf. Britain is anxious to keep her
ill-gotten gains and to make herself strong in the Mediterranean. These
states are already at loggerheads, and their antagonisms are growing
visibly from hour to hour. If Germany can deal out a few heavy blows,
this artificially united front will collapse...4 6
While he correctly noted the differences between the Allies, Hitler underestimated their
steadfast commitment to removing him from power.
Nevertheless, it was this perception that motivated Hitler to create and equip
roughly 30 divisions, 12 panzer and panzergrenadier divisions and 18 infantry (parachute
and volksgreriadier) divisions, for this last desperate gamble through the Ardennes.4 7 The
timing would require at least two months for the Werhmacht to assemble these units and
refit units pulled from the line. It would also permit the attack to coincide with the winter
weather and fog that would keep Allied reconnaissance and tactical bombers grounded
46 Attributed to Hasso Von Manteuffel, "The Battle of the Ardennes 1944-45," in H.A. Jacobsen and J.
Rohwer, eds., De cisive Battles of World War HI: The German View, trans. Edward Fitzgerald (New York:
Putnam's 1965), 401 in Richard K. Betts, "Strategic Surprise for War Termination, "Strategic Military
Surprise," eds. Klaus Knorr and Patrick Morgan (New York: National Strategy Information Center; 1983),
166.
47 Trevor N. Dupuy, David L. Bognard, and Richard C. Anderson, Jr. Hitler's Last Gamble. (New York:
Harper Collins Publishers; 1994), 19.
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and hinder the rapid deployment of reinforcements. Of course, these same challenges
would face the German units. Indeed, SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Sepp Deitrich, one of the
German commanders, cracked that
All Hitler wants me to do is cross a river, capture Brussels, and then go on
and take Antwerp! And all this in the worst time of the year through the
Ardennes where the snow is waist deep and there isn't room to deploy
four tanks abreast let alone an armored division! Where it doesn't get
light until eight and it's dark by four and with reformed divisions made up
chiefly of kids and sick old men - and at Christmas !48
Admittedly, immense challenges lay ahead for the Germans.
Throughout the planning process, Hitler's generals attempted to limit the strategic
goals to capturing the American 1 st and 9 th armies. General von Rundstedt, the
commander of the Western Front, believed that "all, absolutely all conditions for the
possible success of such an offensive [to Antwerp] were lacking." 4 9 Field Marshall
Model, commander of Army Group B, and General von Manteuffel, commander of units
in support of the surprise attack, both attempted to scale the operation back to a smaller
double envelopment. Even General Jodl, chief of the OKW planning staff, noted that
"Antwerp as the objective is 'unalterable, although from a strictly technical standpoint, it
appears to be disproportionate to our available forces. " 5° Despite the protestations from
his generals Hitler forbade any reduction of the plan's objectives even when it was
obvious the operation was faltering, perhaps partly because he had previously overcome
the odds in Austria, Czechoslovakia, and France. Ultimately, the attitude of the German
commanders towards the coming offensive can be discerned when Jodl noted that the
assault through the Ardennes is
48 Charles MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets (New York: Perennial; 1985), 37.
49 Charles MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets (New York: Perennial; 1985), 35.
50 Charles MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets (New York: Perennial; 1985), 36.
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an operation of extreme daring, but Germany is in a desperate situation
and a desperate remedy is needed. We cannot escape our fate by
remaining on the defensive. Such an unexpected bold attack may turn the
tables. At the worst we shall cause the enemy to postpone his assault on
us. Anyway, gentlemen, there can be no arguments - it is the Fuhrer's
orders !",,51
Indeed, Gernany's situation was desperate and deteriorating; "the sheer weight of
numbers, a weight which would increase as more divisions crossed the Atlantic and as
Frenchmen were armed, [would make] a German victory impossible." 52 Thus, Hitler
calculated that only the loss of the British and Canadian armies, in addition to the 1st and
9lh American armies, which comprised nearly half of the Allies forces on the Western
Front, would force the Allies to the negotiating table.
To this end Hitler and the Third Reich managed the astounding feat of raising and
equipping the forces necessary for the attack while facing critical manpower shortages.
However, it should also be noted that in the initial assault there were only five panzer and
thirteen infantry-type divisions with two more panzer divisions and a panzer grenade in
immediate support - roughly 70 percent of the forces Hitler had originally slated for the
offensive.53 After designating the Western Front the highest priority for men and
equipment, manpower climbed from 416,000 on December 1 to 1, 322,000 on December
15 to achieve localized ratios of 3 to 1 in the Ardennes and 10 to 1 in the assault areas.5 4
Moreover, these new units were generally well-equipped with new weapons. Admittedly,
the assault force was woefully short of motorized transport but since gasoline was in
51 Peter Elstob, Hitler's Last Offensive (New York: The MacMillan Company; 1971), 31.
52 Peter Elstob, Hitler's Last Offensive (New York: The MacMillan Company; 1971), 12.
53 Trevor N. Dupuy, David L. Bognard, and Richard C. Anderson, Jr. Hitler's Last Gamble (New York:
Harper Collins Publishers; 1994), 19.
54 Stephen E. Ambrose, Citizen Soldiers (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 185.
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short supply and difficult to transport this may have been a less important factor in its
ultimate defeat.
The events of the battle have been well-covered in the historical literature and
there is little need to recount them here. After several delays related to weather and last
minute preparations, the German attack was finally launched on December 16, 1944. By
dawn, the German Wehrmacht had accomplished the unimaginable, at least as far as
Allied intelligence was concerned. Indeed, "the German Army had concentrated a total
of twenty divisions - with nearly 410,000 men, more than 2,600 artillery pieces and
multiple rocket launchers, and about 1,400 tanks and assault guns - on a 110 kilometer
front facing the U.S. First Army."55 Both Allied commanders and the soldiers in this
heretofore quiet sector were completely surprised by the suddenness, ferocity, and
strength of the penetration from the Eifel into the Ardennes. The soldiers in the field had
no warning from SHAEF indicating a potential attack. Countless small unit heroics and
personal sacrifice slowed the German advance until Allied reserves could be committed
to defensive positions around St. Vith, Bastogne, Malmedy, and other small towns. This
last gasp for the German Wehrmacht was halted well before the Meuse River, only
halfway to Sixth Panzer Army's objective of Antwerp. Ultimately, the Allies were able
to prevent the German breakthrough and slowly force the line back to its original, bulge-
less position.
Although Dwight Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, recognized the
German attack as a great opportunity to engage and destroy the enemy outside of their
fortifications, Generals Patton and Montgomery largely failed to execute the required
55 Trevor N. Dupuy, David L. Bognard, and Richard C. Anderson, Jr. Hitler's Last Gamble (New York:
Harper Collins Publishers; 1994), 35.
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double envelopment, allowing much of the German force to escape. Moreover, it is clear
that had the Allies had adequate warning or even strong suspicions of an attack,
additional experienced forces would likely have been deployed to the Ardennes or near
the region as a strong reserve. The Allied troops manning the line would likely have paid
additional attention to security and been arrayed in a defense in depth, rather than in a
cordon - a deployment more prone to complete collapse if pierced by the enemy.
Clearly, the German attack owed the vast majority of its substantial success to the
operational surprise it was able to achieve.
Elements of Surprise: Terrain, Weather, Secrecy, and Deception
Like Winston Churchill, Hitler took immense personal interest in the military
operations of his country, especially those involving secrecy and surprise. Consequently,
he was personally involved in many aspects of preparations for the attack through the
Ardennes. From selecting the location and timing, to crafting and equipping the force, to
conceiving deception operations, Hitler provided crucial impetus to see his plan executed.
And the success of the surprise in the Ardennes can largely be attributed to several key
factors - location, timing, tight operational security, German deception operations and the
complete failure of Allied intelligence to identify the former or pierce the latter.
Forbidding Terrain
Once again, by selecting the Ardennes from which to launch his counteroffensive
Hitler found a crucial weakness in the Allied line to exploit. Charles B. MacDonald,
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military historian and rifle company commander during the Battle of the Bulge, noted
that the Ardennes was
A westward extension of the high plateau of the Eifel, so deeply etched
through the centuries by serpentine streams that it appears to be less
plateau than mountains,...it presents a rugged face scarred by deep gorges
and twisting stream valleys. It has the shape of a big isosceles triangle
with an eighty-mile base along the frontiers, extending from an ill-defined
point in the north near the Belgian town of Eupen (14 miles south of
Aachen) to the vicinity of Luxembourg City, the capital of Luxembourg,
in the south. Although part of the region protrudes westward beyond the
Meuse River, so deep and broad is the cut of the Meuse that for military
purposes the region can be said to end there, some sixty miles from the
base of the triangle. As the most extensive stands of forest are close to the
German frontier, so too is the most forbidding terrain. For almost the
entire length of the frontier, the terrain poses a major obstacle to
military movement.5 6
Because the terrain was so challenging for maneuver operations and the road network so
limiting, the Allies dismissed the possibility that Hitler would attempt to force 30
divisions through the Ardennes.
Thus, for the Allied forces it was a lightly held section of the line used to rest
battle weary troops and give green replacements some combat experience on the front
line. Both Allied intelligence and the military leadership failed to grasp that the Schnee
Eifel, the German sector directly adjacent to the Ardennes in the east, had two unique
features that would aid any surprise attack. First, the region was covered with a dense
forest punctuated by a few small towns. Peter Elstob, a military historian, notes that "the
heavily wooded terrain east of the breakthrough sector offered ideal cover...Small
villages were used to hide quite large formations and camouflage - an art of which
necessity had made the Germans master - was very strictly applied.5 7 These features
56 Charles MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets (New York: Perennial; 1985), 25-26 (emphasis added). For a
more complete description of the area see also 26-27.
57 Peter Elstob, Hitler's Last Offensive (New York: The MacMillan Company; 1971), 47.
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enabled the Germans to easily hide divisions worth of men, ammunition, supplies, and
vehicles from the limited aerial reconnaissance the Allies conducted just before the
attack. The Allies did not have the numbers of planes to survey the entire front and what
planes they did possess were tasked with higher priority sectors near Cologne. Second, in
preparation for World War I the Prussians had built out a dense network of spur lines
from the marshalling yards at Cologne.5 8 The Germans were able to utilize this rail
network to the edge of the German frontier to quickly amass the 6th Panzer Army, which
saved both time and precious gasoline during the weeks leading to the attack.
Paralyzing Weather
By choosing to attack in the late fall, Hitler hoped to utilize the effect of weather
to achieve a greater surprise against his opponents. Of the climate, MacDonald notes
the Ardennes has a harsh, wet climate, with rainfall averaging 35 to 40
inches a year. Some of the heaviest rains come in November and
December, so saturating the soil that any movement off the roads is
difficult; and with them comes the fog or mist that sometimes fails to clear
before midday and reappears again in late afternoon. Snow sometimes
accumulates up to a foot in depth - deeper in drifts - and cold, raw winds
sweep the heights. 59
Typically, bad weather favors the defender - or at least the side that does not have to
maneuver much. In this case, Hitler hoped that the dense fog would keep Allied tactical
bombers, resupply planes, and aerial reconnaissance planes grounded, delaying the
discovery of the size and scope of the surprise attack and limiting any Allied reaction. In
addition, Hitler likely hoped that the "friction" generated by difficult road conditions
would be a relative advantage for the Germans. To counter the attack the Allies would
58 Charles MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets (New York: Perennial; 1985), 27.
59 Charles MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets (New York: Perennial; 1985), 28.
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have to shuttle supplies and reinforcements from distant positions, while the Germans
would merely be uncoiling from their concentration in the forests of the Schnee Eifel.
Unfortunately for Hitler, the combined "friction" of American small unit's heroic defense
at key junctions and the weather slowed the initial assault sufficiently to preclude any
chance of the German forces recapturing Antwerp.
German Operational Secrecy
Maintaining tight operational secrecy was another crucial factor for the
effectiveness of the surprise attack. First, Hitler limited access to the plans and objectives
to only those with a "need to know." He required code clerks and generals alike to sign a
pledge to guard the information or forfeit their life. Since the plot on his life from earlier
that summer, Hitler falsely suspected that someone in his inner circle was betraying his
plans to the Allies. For years, the Allies had successfully decoded German intercepts and
read the military and diplomatic traffic of messages sent by Enigma machines. Even
though he considered the Enigma machines secure, Hitler forbade any details about
Wacht Am Rhein (the operational code name for the Ardennes attack meaning Watch on
the Rhine) to be sent by telephone, telegraph, or wireless. In fact, special couriers
shadowed by Gestapo agents delivered all communications to ensure no hint of the plan
was compromised to the Allies.60 Trevor Dupuy, a noted military historian points out,
however, that this action
merely confirmed as a direct order what was already an established fact.
Radio had been necessary to deliver messages to the far-flung elements of
the German armed forces in the heyday of the greatest expansion of the
German Reich. However, as the German fighting frontier contracted in
60 Charles MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets (New York: Perennial; 1985), 40.
37
1944 to the old prewar boundaries, there was less need for radio
transmissions.6 '
Still, ULTRA intercepts were deemed vital by the Allies and Hitler prevented the Allies
from reinforcing the Ardennes by his attention to communication security.
The attention to operational security for Wacht Am Rhein went well beyond
communications issues. The German Army's attention to detail was incredible as Elstob
notes that
only the guns that had been in the line for a long time were allowed to fire
and even they on a reduced scale to lend credence to the idea that the
Germans were very low on ammunition. Radio communication was kept
going at exactly the same rate as last month and patrolling was kept down
to a minimum. At the same time further north, where the attack was
supposed to be going in, artillery fire and wireless communication was
greatly stepped up, civilians were openly evacuated and a 'ghost army',
the Twenty-fifth, was created with radio traffic, movements orders and all
the paraphernalia of a new army.6 2
Naturally, soldiers in the divisions assembling for the attack were only told of their
mission on the night before the attack but generals commanding corps had only two
weeks notice and division commanders were informed merely 5 days before null tag
(zero day).6 3 Troops were marched into position at night and permitted only charcoal
fires. Similarly, Germany transported heavy equipment and supplies over the rail lines
during periods of darkness. If these trains were forced off schedule the engineers hid in
tunnels during the day to evade detection by Allied reconnaissance.64 As the tanks and
self-propelled guns approached the front lines, the Wehrmacht covered the roads with
straw and flew planes at low altitude over Allied positions in an attempt to mask the
61 Trevor N. Dupuy, David L. Bognard, and Richard C. Anderson, Jr. Hitler's Last Gamble (New York:
Harper Collins Publishers; 1994), 36-37.
62 Peter Elstob, Hitler's Last Offensive (New York: The MacMillan Company; 1971), 48.
63 Charles MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets (New York: Perennial; 1985), 47.
64 Charles MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets (New York: Perennial; 1985), 46.
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noise.65 Special security detachments prevented anyone from violating the camouflage
discipline. Furthermore, during the last three days of the deployment at distances of 12,
6, and 2 miles from the line, respectively, special attention was paid to the men from
Alsace to keep them from escaping and telling the enemy - only the most trusted veterans
were used for patrols. 6 6 In fact, only five men deserted from the German forces on the
Western Front during the first two weeks of December.67 Finally, for the pre-dawn attack
itself the Germans opted to use either short, but fierce artillery bombardments or the
infiltration of small groups of shock troops to achieve the initial penetration of the Allied
lines. Moreover, these units were aided by artificial light created by bouncing
searchlights off of low clouds.6 8
German Deceptions
Preparations for the surprise attack also included deception operations to enhance
its possibility for success. First, to belie the aggressive nature of the build-up in the
Schnee Eifel, Hitler named the operation Wacht Am Rhein (meaning Watch on the
Rhine). In the event of inadvertent discovery, the defensive connotation of the name was
designed to help persuade foreign intelligence officers that the German forces were
preparing for the coming Allied attack into Germany, rather than preparing for a major
armored thrust to Antwerp.69 Similarly, most official communications concerning the
65 Charles MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets (New York: Perennial; 1985), 48.
66 Charles MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets (New York: Perennial; 1985), 48.
67 Peter Elstob, Hitler's Last Offensive (New York: The MacMillan Company; 1971), 32.
68 Charles MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets (New York: Perennial; 1985), 102. Bizarrely, when Hitler
asked von Manteuffel how he knew there would be low cloud cover, he responded that "You have already
decided there will be bad weather."
69 Later this name was changed to Herbstnebel (meaning Autumn Mist). This code name is also non-
threatening and perhaps an allusion to the fog cover Hitler hoped would keep Allied planes grounded.
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buildup of the 6th Panzer Army began with the phrase "in preparation for the anticipated
enemy offensive" to prey upon Allied preconceptions about German intentions.70
To further mislead Allied perceptions of German intentions, Hitler named Gerd
von Rundstedt to command the Western Front. Von Rundstedt was an old, venerable
Prussian soldier well-versed in the tenets of accepted military doctrine. This appointment
was designed to make Germans and Allied forces alike believe that Hitler was committed
to a grinding war of defensive attrition. Hitler secretly named Generals Model and von
Manteuffel to command the operational forces of Wacht Am Rhein in their drive to
Antwerp. This deception is similar to the one practiced by the Allies when they
fabricated General Patton a fictitious army in England to deceive the Germans into
thinking that Operation Overlord would come ashore at Pas de Calais.
Finally, for the last piece of the deception operation Hitler turned to SS-
Obersturmbannfuhrer Otto Skorzeny. Skorzeny was named to command Operation Greif
and was tasked with seizing key bridges over the Meuse River, cutting lines of
communication, and generally sowing confusion to increase "friction" in the rear of the
Allied forces. To this end the Skorzeny requisitioned English-speaking volunteers,
uniforms, equipment and vehicles to conduct operations behind enemy lines. Stephen
Ambrose, a military historian, notes that
Throughout the Bulge, those 500 or so volunteers in American uniforms
were having an impact beyond their numbers. They turned signposts,
causing great confusion. They spread panic. Once it was known that the
Skorzeny battalion was behind the lines, the word went out with amazing
speed -- trust no one. The GIs, especially the MPs, questioned everyone,
right up to Bradley - who plays center field for the Yankees? Who is
Mickey Mouse's wife? What is the capital of Illinois? General Bradley
was detained for answering Springfield to the last question; the MP
70 Charles MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets (New York: Perennial; 1985), 40.
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insisted it was Chicago. One general was arrested and held for a few
hours because he put the Chicago Cubs in the American League.7 1
Although this Operation Greif (Condor) was effective at sowing confusion, it ultimately
failed to secure vital bridges and Allied supply dumps needed for the Sixth Army's
Panzer divisions to cross the Meuse River.
German Security and Deception Failures
Despite extraordinary operational security measures and careful attention to
deception plans, there were a handful of mistakes that should have alerted SHAEF to the
possibility of a German operations. First, on September 4t h Hitler informed Baron
Hiroshi Oshirna, the Japanese ambassador, that he intended to open a large scale
offensive in the West after the beginning of November. In and of itself, this is somewhat
surprising given how closely he appeared to hold this information within his own
military. On the other hand, Hitler was likely highly conscious of the setbacks inflicted
upon the Third Reich in the Eastern and Western Fronts as well as Italy within the last
year. Given his personality it is likely that he informed his allies both to reassure and
impress them with his ability to mount a major operation. Oshima dutifully reported this
information to the Japanese government as well as a subsequent conversation on
November 15 th confirming Hitler's intention to launch an assault on the Western Front to
his government.7 Under the classified MAGIC program, the United States had been
decrypting Japanese intercepts since before the start of the war. Both messages from
71 Stephen E. Ambrose, Citizen Soldiers (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 219.
72 Charles MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets (New York: Perennial; 1985), 24-25, 48-49. Indeed, the only
benefit of the intercepts may have been to help Eisenhower identify the counteroffensive for what it was,
rather than a spoiling counterattack against Allied concentrations in Aachen.
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Oshima were soon received and decoded but inexplicably neither had any appreciable
effect on the SHAEF planning for the front.
The Germans also let slip another small detail concerning operation Wacht Am
Rhein. In their zeal to recruit volunteers for Skorzeny's Operation Greif the German
command staff requested English-speaking personnel, Allied uniforms and equipment for
"Secret Commando Operations" from all divisions on the Western Front.73 Indeed,
Skorzeny felt that Greif should be cancelled and after the war noted that
This order was subsequently to appear as a most wonderful example of
blundering in so far as the secrecy of the operation [Wacht Am Rhein] was
concerned - an example of blundering by the Supreme Authority of the
German Army...I flew into a towering rage. Incontestably the Allied
secret service would get wind of this affair. After the war, I learned that
less than a week later the Americans were in possession of this order. I
never understood why they drew no conclusions from it and why they
failed to take certain precautions at the time.74
Within weeks the Allied forces had obtained a copy of this order and should have
determined that this sort of commando operation must be offensive in nature.
Still, no additional Allied reconnaissance or intelligence assets were devoted to
probing this issue.
Nevertheless, through high operational security, Allied preconceptions, and luck,
Hitler and the Germans managed to prevent the Allies from discovering both their
intentions and their reconstituted force until it was too late.
73 Much has been made of Skorzeny's "150 Brigade", the special operations brigade, but he admits that he
was only able to obtain 10 sailors fluent in English, and about 150 who could make themselves understood.
The rest of his 3,000 odd men command would have to act as deaf mutes. Otto Skorzeny, Skorzeny's
Secret Missions, trans. Jacques Le Clercq (New York: E.P. Dutton and Co., Inc.; 1950) 224, 228-229.
74 Otto Skorzeny, Skorzeny's Secret Missions, trans. Jacques Le Clercq (New York: E.P. Dutton and Co.,
Inc.; 1950), 224-225.
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Allied Intelligence Failures
The German surprise attack through the Ardennes was clearly a significant Allied
intelligence failure. Despite the operational secrecy and deception operations, it should
never have been possible for Hitler to assemble 20 divisions in the Schnee Eifel and
launch an attack of that magnitude without some kind of warning. In retrospect, the
Allies had sufficient intelligence (e.g. signal intercepts, local reports, and changing order
of battle information) to avoid being caught completely flat-footed. Admittedly, it is easy
to sift evidence through the filter of hindsight. Yet it seems clear that with what little
facts which were available that something was amiss and that more intelligence should be
collected and analyzed. Tactically, the Allies lacked aerial reconnaissance, human
intelligence sources in Germany, relied too heavily upon ULTRA intercepts, and
generally conducted too little all-source analysis. Structurally, there was poor interfacing
both up and down the chain of command from SHAEF to the platoons on the front line as
well as between the various army groups in the sector. The biggest problem, however,
was the perception that the Germans were beaten and that it was only a matter of time
before they crumbled in defeat. Trevor Dupuy, the historian, laments that
"Unfortunately, in the euphoric aftermath of the successful drive across France and the
stunning Soviet victories in the east, Allied intelligence predicated all their estimates on
the expected early collapse of the German war effort.75
Poor weather during the fall limited the number of aerial reconnaissance missions
to only a few hundred. What few missions that were not scrubbed because of fog focused
on the sector of the Hurtgen Forest and the German positions across the Roer River
75 Trevor N. Dupuy, David L. Bognard, and Richard C. Anderson, Jr. Hitler's Last Gamble (New York:
Harper Collins Publishers; 1994), 40.
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adjacent Aachen, in preparation for the coming Allied offensive. Even though the Eifel
region was frequently requested, pilots often chose to survey higher priority areas while
the weather held. Unfortunately, the Allies had been successfully deceived into believing
that Hitler was creating the 6th Panzer Army as a mobile reserve near Cologne to counter
Allied forces in the north. Indeed, during the last five days leading up to the attack only
three missions were flown over the Schnee Eifel.76 The pilot of one of these missions
was surprised to encounter heavy anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) in this supposedly quiet
sector.77 There is no indication that his report had any impact on warning or operations
in the Ardennes.
What had heretofore been a useful source of information for intelligence officers
- namely spies and informants in France and Belgium - suddenly dried up as Allied
forces entered Germany proper. Major General Kenneth Strong, Eisenhower's Chief of
Intelligence noted that
It was not a simple matter to estimate German capabilities and intentions
at this time. The excellent sources of Intelligence from which we had
profited in France and Belgium were no longer available. There we had a
generally sympathetic population and people who, often at great risk to
themselves, told us much about the Germans, sometimes using messengers
from the Resistance groups, sometimes using shortwave wireless sets.7
Moreover, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was largely excluded from running
agents in Germnnany by Army intelligence officers. Worse, most Germans were still loyal
to the Fuhrer or at least to their family members fighting for the Third Reich. Initially,
there was little love was lost between American soldiers and German townspeople.
76 Charles MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets (New York: Perennial; 1985), 56.
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Consequently, Allied soldiers were no longer to obtain reliable intelligence on local
German troop movements or intentions.
The lack of human intelligence placed even greater defacto reliance upon
ULTRA intercepts. Unfortunately, for the Allies two factors limited the usefulness of
messages decrypted at Bletchley Park during the fall of 1944. First, the Germans were
now back in their own country where they could rely more or less upon secure telephone
exchanges to a much greater degree than when during the occupation of France. Second,
Hitler's intuition to prevent any detail of the Wacht Am Rhein operation from being
transmitted electrically was prescient. But the problem was even more pervasive than
simply losing the intelligence. Trevor Dupuy eloquently summarizes this dilemma when
he writes that
The Allies' reliance on ULTRA had infected the high-command
intelligence staffs (direct ULTRA information was not disseminated below
the level of field army), with a pervading sense of complacency. The
older means of intelligence gathering were not only less depended on but
considered to be less dependable. Unfortunately, to a great extent the lack
(or apparent lack) of data on German capabilities and intentions was
interpreted as a loss of strength on the part of the Germans rather than a
loss of information on the Allies.79
After becoming accustomed to the depth and quality of the message traffic delivered by
ULTRA in the preceding years, the military leadership was blindsided by the attack in the
Ardennes because no mention of it had been made in the German wireless military
traffic. Despite this, it does seem that Eisenhower quickly realized that the attack was a
large counteroffensive rather than the spoiling attack the General Bradley believed it to
79 Trevor N. Dupuy, David L. Bognard, and Richard C. Anderson, Jr. Hitler's Last Gamble (New York:
Harper Collins Publishers; 1994), 38.
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be.80 Perhaps this could be attributed to Ike's knowledge of the MAGIC intercepts of the
Japanese or simply a greater perception of the enemy's intentions.
Other signs of German interest in and around the Ardennes were also ignored or
misunderstood. For example, intelligence officers throughout the Allied commands
failed to attribute particular importance to increasing German requests for low level
reconnaissance over the Ardennes or desperate pleas to maintain the rigid train schedules
into the Eifel region.81 While taken separately these intercepts could have been attributed
to defensive preparations for the upcoming Allied attack, but taken in conjunction with
the captured order seeking English-speaking volunteers for commando operations it
seems that this should have raised suspicions. Greater attention to all-source analysis
(e.g. signal, human intelligence, aerial reconnaissance and armed reconnaissance) could
have made a substantial difference in reducing the element of surprise and minimizing
losses during the Battle of the Bulge.
While a myriad of intelligence problems existed within the Allied Expeditionary
Force, there was little recognition of that fact and less impetus to rectify the situation.
Unfortunately, most of the ranking intelligence officers concurred with the assessment
that Germany was on its last legs. In late August (nearly two and a half months before
the Battle of the Bulge), Eisenhower's G-2, Major General Kenneth W. D. Strong,
asserted that after "two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans
in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the
war in Europe within sight, almost within reach."8 2 Just days before the Germans
80 Charles MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets (New York: Perennial; 1985), 185.
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46
assaulted the Ardennes, Brigadier General Edwin L. Sibert, 12th Army's G-2, believed
that "it is now certain that attrition is steadily sapping the strength of German forces on
the western fi'ont and that the crust of defenses is thinner, more brittle and more
vulnerable than it appears on G-2 maps or to troops in the line."83 Nor was the
underestimation limited to American intelligence officers. Brigadier E.T. Williams,
General Montgomery's G-2, asserted around this same time that "the enemy is in a bad
way...his situation is such that he cannot stage a major offensive operation." 84 Ironically,
on December 16th, 1944, the day of the attack, General Montgomery, wrote that
The enemy is at present fighting a defensive campaign on all fronts; his
situation is such that he cannot stage major offensive operations.
Furthermore, at all costs he has to prevent the war from entering a mobile
phase; he has not the support or the petrol that would be necessary for
mobile operations, nor could his tanks compete with ours in the mobile
battle.85
In the end game, perhaps these estimates could be considered accurate since the Sixth
Panzer Army was never able to achieve its objectives. Nevertheless, it seems clear that
Allied intelligence and leadership vastly overestimated the weakness of the Third Reich.
There were only two senior intelligence officers who appeared to recognize the
danger. The first was General Patton's G-2, Col. Koch. By December 10th, Koch
believed that if von Rundstedt was pulling Panzer divisions out of the line when the
German forces were so hard-pressed in both the north and south that the Germans must
be planning a counter-attack to blunt the Allied blow against Festung Deutschland
(Fortress Gennany).8 6 This briefing convinced Patton's staff to conduct contingency
83 Charles MacDonald, A Timefor Trumpets (New York: Perennial; 1985), 53.
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planning to prepare to respond to attacks from the Ardennes, which later allowed the
Third Army tlo turn north into the shoulder of the Bulge in just a few days. Col. "Monk"
Dickson of the First Army, seemed to believe that the German threat in the Ardennes was
real. In estimate No. 37, issued by Dickson in December of 1944 he warned that the
enemy was husbanding resources and that morale was very high, both somewhat atypical
for German forces in this area at this stage of the war - potentially indicating an attack in
the Ardennes.. 87 Unfortunately, Dickson did not get along personally or professionally
with Sibert of the First Army and consequently there was little communication between
the commands. Moreover, Dickson had such a reputation as a pessimist that whenever
units disappeared from the order of battle in different sectors he would include them in
his own estimates often without evidence. This threat inflation was commonly referred to
as "Monk's Shrubbery," and certainly reduced the credibility of his hunch about the
Ardennes in 1944. Even though Dickson was later proved correct about the coming
Battle of the Bulge he failed as an intelligence officer to provide his command or SHAEF
timely, accurate, and persuasive evidence for his beliefs.
Amongst the units facing the coming assault, it is astounding that Dickson stood
virtually alone in providing warning. In an obvious case of "mirror-imaging" - having
expectations about another's actions based on what you would do in the same situation -
the Allied generals and intelligence officers did not foresee the coming attack because
they deemed the terrain and weather too difficult. Elstob correctly asserts that
There were many reasons why such an offensive was not considered
feasible: the terrain and the weather seemed to make large-scale armoured
movement impossible, such an advance between heavy Allied
concentrations in the north and the south would leave a vacuum behind it
which these forces could rapidly fill, and lastly all intelligence reports
87 Charles MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets (New York: Perennial; 1985), 70-7 1.
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indicated that Germany did not have the tanks, guns, planes, ammunition
or men for anything but limited attacks.8 8
Kenneth Strong, head of SHAEF intelligence, agreed when he wrote that he based his
"estimate of German capabilities partly on the number of divisions we thought they had
available and their lack of equipment and poor training, and partly on the general German
logistical weakness, including the shortage of fuel for tanks." 89 Thus, following the
prevailing view, Allied intelligence officers had no clear intelligence signal that the
Germans had the remaining military ability to launch a counteroffensive of 20-30
divisions. Indeed, every Allied soldier from Eisenhower to the green private from the
Replacement Depot believed that "the German troops facing us were of low quality and
seemed to be of the opinion that if we didn't bother them, they would leave us alone."90
Unfortunately, this was not to be the case.
Conclusion
Ultimately, the Germans failed to achieve their triumvirate of goals - to recapture
Antwerp, destroy the British, Canadian and American armies in the north, and force a
separate peace upon the Allies on the Western Front. Contributing factors to its defeat
include the challenging terrain, the cold, wet weather, mud, insufficient supplies of
gasoline and ammunition, too few tanks, not enough experienced soldiers. These
frictions became increasingly severe until the attack ground to halt before the banks of
the Meuse River. Admittedly, each of these reasons were recognized and understood by
88 Peter Elstob, Hitler's Last Offensive (New York: The MacMillan Company; 1971), 46.
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the Allies which is why they never believed the Third Reich would risk so much on such
a reckless gamble.
On the other hand, it was not the weather or the terrain that destroyed the German
Panzer divisions. Small American forces fought tenacious delaying battles, wrecking
German timetables and buying time for some forces to escape and others to move into
blocking positions. Eisenhower also recognized the attack for what it was early in the
fight - a major counteroffensive. He quickly responded by ordering the 10 1st and units
from the 10th Armor to Bastogne, the 82nd to the north as a reserve, Patton's Army to
attack the southern flank, and temporarily granted the British General Montgomery
control of the American First and Ninth Army. Hitler had counted upon confusion and
delay as Eisenhower sought political guidance and permissions to respond. Moreover,
Hitler did not understand the enormous logistics capabilities of the Allies and the Red
Ball Express. Of this Allied advantage, Ambrose writes
On December 17th alone, 11,000 trucks carried 60,000 men, plus
ammunition, gasoline, medical supplies, and other materiel into the
Ardennes. In the first week of the battle, Eisenhower was able to move
250,000 men and 50,000 vehicles into the fray. This was mobility with a
vengeance. 9 1
Finally, the cold weather and fog which so hampered early Allied efforts at aerial
reconnaissance, resupply and interdiction could not last forever. When the weather
finally cleared German movements and positions were no longer screened by fog. Allied
air interdiction was finally able to harass and destroy the remnants of the Hitler's last
strategic reserve - wasted in a desperate gamble in the Ardennes.
91 Stephen E. Ambrose, Citizen Soldiers (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 201.
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Despite these obstacles the course of the Battle of the Bulge and the war on the
Western Front remains a disputed counterfactual question. Had the Germans crossed the
Meuse River in the first few days and seized Antwerp in the first 2 weeks the shape of
history might look quite different. Nor was this outside the realm of possibility. For the
first two weeks, Allied forces suffered serious setbacks and high unit casualties.
Fortunately, enough of a tactical force remained effective to blunt and slow the advancing
German columns.
Let us then return to the original question concerning what allowed this near
catastrophe to occur. Was Germany secrecy and deception so good that the Allies could
not have discovered the activities in the Schnee Eifel? Or did Allied commanders and
intelligence officers blind themselves to the remaining capabilities and will of the Third
Reich's war machine? After reviewing the Battle of the Bulge the answer seems to be
more the latter than the former. The Allies did not see the attack coming because they
did not look for an impending attack or the signals that might threaten such an action.
Nor can their inaction be attributed solely to their dependence on ULTRA intercepts.
Although it is true that the Allies relied heavily on ULTRA messages to guide their
strategy, they simply failed to collect sufficient intelligence or interpret the information
they did have correctly. More simply put, the Allies did not anticipate the Battle of the
Bulge because a German counteroffensive seemed beyond the realm of reasonable
possibility.
In the fall of 1944 the Allied Expeditionary Force failed to detect the buildup of
the 6th Panzer Army across its front and reinforce these undermanned sector. The Allies
did not actively seek appropriate intelligence on their enemy's disposition and intentions
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and misread the intelligence they did manage to collect. This lapse, in turn, was
encouraged by the Germans who did everything in their power to leave the Allies with
their misperceptions. Admittedly, better intelligence would not have prevented the
attack, but the Ardennes region could have been reinforced and units along the line
arrayed in a manner to create a greater defensive depth to blunt the force of the German
attack. It seems clear now, that had the Allies had been examining their enemy closely
and interfacing with the various commands across the front, that they would have been
more guarded in their disposition.
Thus, the lesson from the Battle of the Bulge is that in moments of an adversary's
weakness is when one should be most wary. Given Hitler's personality and his past
actions when weak (including Austria, Czechoslovakia, and France) the Allies should
have expected a last ditch gamble. Even Churchill believed that "madness...is an
affliction which in war carries with it the advantage of surprise."9 2
The Battle of the Bulge is instructive for the bitter lessons the Allies had to learn.
First, do not rely upon a single source of intelligence no matter how valuable. By using
all sources a more complete and credible picture can be assembled. In this case, the
Allied reliance upon ULTRA was a serious failing. Intelligence must be coordinated and
communicated not just within individual collection units but across them all. In this
manner everyone can see the puzzle become clearer as the pieces are assembled.
Intelligence units need personnel to generate accurate, timely, and persuasive estimates
so that commanders have time to react appropriately. For example, Dickson, the only
92 Winston S. Churchill, The Aftermath, 1918-1928 (New York: Scribner's 1929), 603 as noted in Barton
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officer, to guess the danger lurking in the forests of Schnee Eifel was not believed
because he constantly inflated the threat in his reports. Lastly, it must be reiterated that
one should never cease to be wary of an enemy even when he appears close to defeat,
because recovering from a surprise attack is a costly and uncertain endeavor. Musing on
the difficulties of executing a surprise attack, Clausewitz notes, "The enemy force can
never assemble and advance so secretly that the defender's first news of it would come
from his outposts. If that were to happen, one could only feel very sorry for him...9 3
One can only wonder what he would have thought of the operational surprise attack on
the Allied forces in the Ardennes during the Battle of the Bulge.
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CHAPTER III
Blinded by Hubris:
The Chinese Counterattack in the Korean War
The wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong
enemy.94
- General Omar Bradley
This second case study examines the Chinese counterattack against the U.N.
forces fighting in North Korea. Many theorists improperly consider the Chinese attack
across the Yalu River to be a strategic surprise attack. Instead, 8t h Army, X Corps, and
Republic of Korea (ROK) units suffered from a skillfully executed operational surprise
attack, albeit with significant strategic ramifications. The argument is not one of scale.
Certainly, the introduction of several hundred thousand Chinese combat troops into North
Korea places it squarely within the realm of operational or strategic surprise, rather than
tactical surprise. Critics will argue that Communist China was not previously directly
engaged in hostilities on the Korean peninsula. Moreover, the Congress of the United
States had not officially declared war. Instead the Truman administration had led the
U.N. to initiate a "police action" to end the aggression of North Korea and restore peace
to South Korea.
The reality of the situation, however, was that U.S. and U.N. forces were fighting
a limited war against North Korean communist forces. The entrance of the Chinese
Communist Forces (CCF) did not open a new front or theater in the war; nor did the
Chinese attack across an international border. Their troops hid in the mountains of North
94 William Manchester, American Caesar (Boston: Little, Brown and Company; 1978), 612.
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Korea and struck and enveloped U.N. columns after they had advanced past their
positions. Thus, the Chinese merely supplied additional troops and aid to a beleaguered
ally and fought from within that ally's own territory. Because the U.S. was already at
war in that theater, indeed the same theater of operations, the Chinese intervention must
be considered an operational surprise attack.
Returning then to the focus of this analysis, the real question is not whether an
operational surprise occurred in the highlands of North Korea, but how did the U.S. and
U.N. forces fail to predict the intervention of hundreds of thousands of Chinese troops
into Korea? ])id terrain and weather play a critical role in blinding the U.N.
reconnaissance? Were these veterans of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) particularly
adept at maintaining operational secrecy? Did the Chinese government use feint or
deceptions to lead the U.N. forces to believe they would refrain from attack or attack in a
different location? Or did the U.N. and U.S. intelligence simply fail to accurately
forecast the intentions and capabilities of the Chinese Communists and, if so, why?
The following sections summarize the Chinese intervention and analyze the
relative importance of terrain, weather, operational secrecy, strategic deception, and
intelligence failure to its success. Not surprisingly, each of these factors contributed to
the success of the Chinese surprise attacks. Critical, however, was the failure of U.S.
intelligence to understand Chinese motivation and intentions in the region or
subsequently t:o detect Chinese infiltration into North Korea.
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"Unexpected Developments": Chinese Counterattack in the Korean War
On June 2 5th, 1950, North Korean forces under the communist leadership of Kim
Il Sung launched a strategic surprise attack against South Korea. Despite months of
border incursions and warnings from intelligence and diplomatic officers, both South
Korea and the United States were unprepared for the onslaught of men and Soviet-
supplied armor. Seoul, the South Korean capital, quickly fell and South Korean army
resistance crumbled. U.S. and U.N. forces were eventually pushed into a small corner of
the peninsula called the Pusan Perimeter. The situation was a stalemate; the North
Koreans could not force the American forces to withdraw but for them to break out of the
bridgehead would have been extremely costly.
As a result, General Douglas MacArthur, the commander of the U.N. force,
conceived and executed a brilliant amphibious landing well behind enemy lines. The
landing was so risky that MacArthur had to defend his plan by arguing that it was likely
to succeed because "the enemy commander will reason that no one would be so brash as
to make such an attempt... Surprise is the most vital element for success in war."9 5
Ironically, MacArthur understood and valued the element of surprise yet did little to
protect his forces from suffering from it during their drive to the Yalu. Nevertheless, the
operational surprise attack at Inchon was a staggering success. American troops cut
North Korean supply lines and narrowly missed the envelopment and destruction of the
entire North Korean force. Yet, even in the hour of his success, the specter of Chinese
intervention caused MacArthur to inquire, "Have we seen or heard anything of the
Russians or Chinese?"96
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MacArthur was right to worry. Until Inchon, the Chinese and Soviets were
content to let the North Koreans engage the South Korean and U.S. military forces while
providing supplies and avoiding direct confrontation. When the North Korean army
collapsed it quickly became apparent that the U.S.-led coalition might drive to the border
of Manchuria and unite the Korean peninsula under a pro-U.S. government. Apart from
losing a friendly communist government on its border, the Chinese also valued the
hydropower generated in the reservoirs and rivers around the Yalu for industrial
production. 97 Mao Zedong and the Chinese Politburo also believed that a confrontation
with the United States was inevitable, particularly over the fate of Taiwan. Mao decided
he could make a better case for intervention if China's territorial safety was directly
threatened by the Americans troops. 98 Upon learning that the North Koreans had suffered
about 40 percent losses (equivalent to 50,000 men killed) the Chinese felt that they had to
intervene.9 9 General Nie Rongzhen, the commander of the North China Field Army,
perhaps most colorfully expressed the motivation for aiding Kim I Sung's failing regime
by noting that "when the lips are destroyed, the teeth feel cold."' ° ° Thus, with the North
Korean army in disarray, China began to prepare for the possibility of war in North Korea
while simultaneously warning the United States of the consequences of approaching
Manchuria.
Even though the Chinese did make public pronouncements warning the U.S. not
to cross the 3 8 th parallel, these were dismissed by the Truman administration as "bluffs"
97 James McGovern, To the Yalu: From the Chinese Invasion of Korea to MacArthur's Dismissal (New
York: William Morrow & Company, Inc.; 1972), 40.
98 Chen Jing, China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New
York: Columbia University Press; 1993), 153-156.
99 Brian Catchpole, The Korean War 1950-53 (New York: Carrol and Graf Publishers, Inc.; 2000), 73.
'00 Bong Lee, The Unfinished War: Korea (New York: Algora Publishing; 2003), 127.
57
or "blackmail." Evidence of the warnings is covered in greater detail in a subsequent
section. As history has shown, the Chinese were willing to fight a war with the
Americans to make the point that it was no longer the "sick man of Asia." Indeed, the
Chinese General Peng described the strategy as a "limited intervention in Korea, [to]
inflict a quick defeat on the Americans, make them reconsider their policies and force
their withdrawal. If this ploy [of limited intervention] should fail, then launch a full-scale
offensive against the United Nations." 01 Unfortunately, when the Chinese did not follow
up on their initial successes the U.S. commanders attributed their action to weakness and
a reluctance to fight.
Given the possibility that the Chinese were willing to engage a smaller, but more
modem and heavily armed force, MacArthur should have expected them to utilize tactics
similar to those previously employed against the Chinese Nationalists. In fact, had
anyone bothered to read Mao's treatise On Protracted War published in 1938, they would
have seen a blueprint for the initial counteroffensive against the U.N. forces. Mao argued
that
Our strategy should be to employ our main forces in mobile warfare over
an extended, shifting, and indefinite front, a strategy depending for
success on a high degree of mobility in difficult terrain, and featured by
the swift attack and withdrawal, swift concentration and dispersal. It will
be a large-scale war of movement rather than a positional war depending
exclusively on defensive works with deep trenches, high fortresses, and
successive defensive positions...We must avoid great decisive battles in
the early stages of the war, and must first employ mobile warfare
gradually to break the morale, the fighting spirit, and the military
efficiency of the living forces of the enemy.
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Mao also acknowledged that "we have always advocated the policy of luring the enemy
to penetrate deep because this is the most effective policy for a weak army in strategic
defense against a strong army.1 0 3 Unfortunately, by dividing his forces into two pincers
and sending them into the North Korean hills MacArthur inadvertently leaned into the
Chinese punch.
Even given the lack of intelligence on Chinese intervention, it is odd that
MacArthur did not act with more caution. Supposedly, he was aware that when the
Japanese crossed the 38th Parallel in 1904 a Russian government had made it a casus
belli.04 History should have sensitized him to the psychological importance of this
latitudinal boundary. Moreover, his orders from the Joint Chiefs of Staff repeatedly
stressed the need to avoid Chinese and Soviet intervention. For example, on September
11 after the landing at Inchon they wrote that "if there was no 'indication or threat' of
intervention by Peking or Moscow, he was then "to extend his operations north of the
Parallel and to make plans for the occupation of North Korea."'0 5 And later the JCS
reemphasized that MacArthur's
military objective is the destruction of the North Korean armed forces. In
attaining this objective you are authorized to conduct military
operations.. .north of the 3 8th Parallel in Korea, provided that at the time
of the operations there has been no entry into North Korea by major
Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, no announcement of intended
entry, nor a threat to counter our operations militarily in North Korea.
Under no circumstances, however, will your forces cross the Manchurian
or USSR borders of Korea and, as a matter of policy, no non-Korean
ground forces will be used in the northeast provinces bordering the Soviet
Union or in the area along the Manchurian border.' 0 6
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MacArthur, however, believed that the Chinese were unwilling or incapable of
effectively intervening after his landing at Inchon. Since he felt that "Korea was Mars'
last gift to an old warrior," it seems that MacArthur felt he could silence his critics and
burnish his career with one more resounding victory.107 Thus, on November 2 4 th he
ordered one last "massive compression envelopment" which, if successful, "for all
practical purposes end the war."'0 8 Sadly, his attempt to get his troops home by
Christmas failed.
In fact, by the third week of November the Chinese had assembled a massive
force to counter MacArthur's men. One historian summarizes the situation as follows:
In front of the 8th Army in the west was the XIII Army Group of the
Chinese Fourth Field Army. This comprised eighteen infantry divisions of
some 180,000 men. Concentrated before X Corps in the east was IX
Army Group of the Chinese Third Field Army, with twelve infantry
divisions of about 120,000 men. In addition to this force of at least
300,000 Chinese, twelve divisions of the North Korean Army, numbering
about 65,800 men had recovered sufficiently to be fit to reenter combat.
And about 40,000 guerillas were operating behind the U.N. Command.'0 9
Just days after the UN forces began the envelopment offensive to end the war, the
Chinese Communist Forces attacked in strength, ending any hopes of reaching the Yalu
by Christmas.. In a single stroke, "the war was transformed from a police action against
an obscure and weak government to a conflict with the most populous nation in the world
and the second-ranking communist power."" 0 Despite being badly mauled, the UN
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forces were able to conduct a fighting retreat out of the mountains."' Ultimately, after
years of additional fighting the battle lines would stabilize again at the 38th parallel and
on July 27, 1)53 the armistice formalizing the Demilitarized Zone would be signed.
Now let us examine the elements of operational surprise that may have
contributed to the defeat inflicted on the U.N. forces in North Korea, including terrain
and weather, strategic deception, operational secrecy and tactical deception, and
intelligence failure.
Terrain and Weather in North Korea
Two elements that contributed to the operational surprise in North Korea were the
inhospitable terrain and bitter weather of the Korean winter. The Chinese capitalized on
the advantage that the topography offered their soldiers. One MacArthur biographer
notes that in North Korea:
The hills in fact seem interminable. They are also dun-colored, granitic,
steep, and speckled here and there with boulders, scrub oaks, and stunted
firs... The hillsides are gouged with thousands of dells and gorges, many
deep enough to conceal battalions of troops. It is ideal terrain for guerilla
fighting. 1
Certainly, at the start of the campaign the hills and valleys kept the Chinese Communist
Forces well hidden from the ROK and U.N. forces as they drove north to the Yalu River.
"' This example is noteworthy because it contradicts the widely held view that the surprised country will
suffer much higher casualties than its attacker. Although it was the UN/US forces that were surprised the
Chinese bore the brunt of the casualties. Records indicate that the 1St Marine Division had incurred 4,418
battle casualties (604 killed, 114 dead from wounds, 192 missing, and 3,508 wounded), while captured
Chinese documents indicate they suffered 37,500 casualties (15,000 killed and 7,500 wounded by the
Marine ground forces, plus 10,000 killed and 7,500 wounded by air operation). In this case, air superiority
and better weapons allowed the surprised entity to inflict very heavy casualties on its attacker. Note these
numbers are from Joseph C. Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War (New York: Times Books;
1982), 381.
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Although it is difficult to find Chinese statements commenting on their use of terrain, its
importance to the Chinese can be inferred by their choice of ambush location. Fighting in
the flat, coastal areas would have enabled the American and U.N. forces much greater use
of their mobile supply lines, armor, and tactical room to maneuver. In the mountains the
soldiers and marines were often forced to secure the ridgelines on both sides of a single,
narrow road and fight through roadblocks and ambushes during their retreat to the coast.
This style of fighting limited the amount of firepower the American forces could bring to
bear against the Chinese and made the effective use of artillery particularly difficult.
Additionally, the central spine of mountains induced MacArthur separate the X Corps
and 8th Army and attempt a double envelopment of the remnants of the North Korean
force. This division left the flanks of both columns exposed in the towering mountains
and meant that neither force was able to reinforce the other or even communicate by
radio. 113
Aside from the benefits to surprise of attacking the American and U.N. forces in
the Korean highlands the Chinese had three other strategic reasons for this location.
First, they were protecting an important source of electricity. As James McGovern notes
Electricity generated at many dams and reservoirs on the Yalu and its
tributaries provided the basic supply of power for North Korean and
Manchurian mining and manufacturing. Manchuria had the richest
agricultural resources in China and was that country's most highly
developed industrial region, largely as the result of the Japanese
occupation from 1931 to 1945. For these practical reasons, Peking might
well be concerned about an advance of foreign armies toward the Yalu
River. 14
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Some of these critical power generation stations were located near the Chosin and Fujon
Reservoirs in North Korea. Second, the Yalu River flows between Chinese and North
Korea border for five hundred miles through a "gorgelike channel rimmed by high
mountains, before emptying into the Yellow Sea. "l5 Had MacArthur's forces managed to
reach the Yalu River, the Chinese would have had a challenging time attacking against
these well-defended heights. Lastly, the Chinese Politburo believed that since a
confrontation between the U.S. and China was inevitable, Korea was a more
advantageous battlefield than either Vietnam or Taiwan because of its proximity to
Manchuria and its topography." 6
Along with the terrain, the bitterly cold weather may have enhanced the
effectiveness of the Chinese counteroffensive in North Korea. Fresh snowfall would
often conceal evidence of Chinese movement from the little aerial reconnaissance the
U.N. forces employed. At night temperatures could easily drop to negative tens of
degrees and soldiers on both sides suffered from frostbite, exposed skin instantly freezing
to metal, malfunctioning weapons, and, for the U.N., difficulty in keeping vehicles
operational. In fact, neither side was properly equipped with cold weather gear for winter
combat. While stories abound of U.N. soldiers struggling to deal with the incessant cold,
the Chinese soldiers were no better off. In fact, Russell Spurr describes the horror that
Chinese reinforcements witnessed in the North Korea hills when he writes that
Whole platoons appeared to have perished, squatting in squad order, rifles
on shoulders, kitbags on backs, all snow-sheathed, terrible. Gangs of
coolies had frozen to death, pressed down by their heavy A-frames, and
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there were smatterings of North Korean refugees, women and children
mostly, heaped hopelessly together in search of warmth. A few old men
in tall Korean hats had chosen to meet their end sitting bolt upright, hands
folded in laps, like Buddhas frosted by the snow.'
Certainly, the horrific weather elevated both combat and non-combat related casualties
for both sides. The snow and frigid temperatures hindered American reinforcement and
logistics convoys as well as air support. On balance this was an advantage for the
Chinese forces because they were both psychologically willing and physically capable of
sustaining much higher casualty ratios than their American counterparts.
Ominous Warnings or Strategic Deception?
Unlike their use of secrecy and tactical deception, the Chinese counteroffensive in
North Korea was preceded by almost no strategic deceptions. The Chinese Communist
leadership repeatedly warned the United States and her U.N. allies in both public
pronouncements and private conversations that they would not allow American forces to
approach the Yalu River or the vital Manchurian industrial region that lies just beyond it.
Unfortunately, MacArthur, President Truman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary of
State Dean Acheson, all believed that the Chinese communists were bluffing. As a result,
they were completely surprised when the Chinese forces ambushed the U.N. forces. In
fact, despite fierce attacks and plenty of evidence of Chinese involvement it took days for
MacArthur to realize that American faced an "entirely new war."' 18 In retrospect, it is
not surprising that the Chinese chose to warn the United States about the consequences of
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approaching the Yalu, given their resolve to protect their interests. 19 What is remarkable
is that American intelligence units failed to ascertain the truth of their intentions or detect
their movement into Korea. The sheer size of Chinese forces in the theater might have
given even the hubris-filled MacArthur pause in his drive to the Yalu.
While the Chinese warnings were explicit and persistent, they were not directly
transmitted to the United States because the two countries did not have diplomatic
relations. For example, a mere 10 days after the Inchon landing, Chinese General Nieh
Jung-Chen informed the Indian diplomat Sardar K. Panikkar that China would not "sit
back with folded hands and let the Americans come to the border...We know what we
are in for, but at all costs American aggression has to be stopped.'20 One week later,
Chou En-lai the foreign minister noted in a speech that "the Chinese people absolutely
will not tolerate foreign aggression, nor will they supinely tolerate seeing their neighbors
being savagely invaded by imperialists."' 2 The following day, October 3, En-lai pledged
that American intrusion into North Korea would encounter Chinese resistance." 122 One
week later, after ROK and U.S. units continued their drive north, the Chinese Ministry of
Foreign Affairs asserted that "now that the American forces are attempting to cross the
119 The Chinese expected to endure an American blockade, the bombing of their coastal cities and perhaps
even nuclear weapons. Indeed, the acting Chief of Staff of the Army, General Nieh is reported to have
remarked to Ambassador Panikkar that "We have calculated all that [the bombing]...They may even drop
atom bombs on us. What then? The may kill a few million people. Without sacrifice, a nation's
independence cannot be upheld...After all, China lives on farms. What can atom bombs do there?" James
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3 8th parallel on a large scale, the Chinese people cannot stand idly by with regard to such
a serious situation created by the invasion of Korea."'2 3
Despite these repeated pronouncements, American leadership and intelligence
believed that the Chinese were bluffing. Part of the disbelief stemmed from their use of
Panikkar, an Indian diplomat who had been friendly with the communists in the past.
Moreover it seemed to make little sense to commit forces to help a regime that seemed
nearly destroyed. On September 10, Secretary of State Acheson noted that "I think it
would be sheer madness on the part of the Chinese Communists to do that [intervene] and
I see no advantage to them doing that."' 24 Even President Truman, who was worried
about both Chinese and Russian intervention believed that Chou En-lai's warnings were
"a bald attempt to blackmail the United Nations."'2 5 Sadly, the assessment of the
American political and military leadership was wrong. The Chinese would intervene and
force the military stalemate at the 3 8th parallel that continues to this day.
It can be argued that the Chinese did make some small use of strategic deception
before their surprise counterattack. First, on July 7t h the Politburo ordered the formation
of a "Northeast Defense Army," perhaps suggesting that it would only be used in defense
of Manchuria and not in operations supporting the North Koreans. 12 6 In reality, this army
group was always intended to confront the American forces and was quickly renamed the
Chinese Volunteer Army (CVA) to maintain the pretense that it was volunteers from the
PLA rather than official Chinese military units. Another potential example of deception
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occurred on October 12, 1950 when ROK troops captured 9 Chinese soldiers in poorly
concealed hiding places. They claimed to be part of only 9000 other Chinese volunteers
who were fighting with the North Koreans.127 It is unclear whether these prisoners were
ordered to surrender and then mislead the U.N. forces or simply uneducated peasant
soldiers unaware of the hundreds of thousands of other Chinese soldiers in Korea.
Indeed, the latter seems more likely. Still, evidence of 9,000 Chinese 'volunteers' would
have been a significant addition (nearly 12%) to the badly mauled North Korean forces.
Even more bizarre is the fact that there seems to have been no additional intelligence
collection efforts to verify their claims or attempt to locate the Chinese forces.
Had the Chinese so desired they could have hinted about invading Taiwan. Better
yet, the Chinese could have made a show of force north of the Yalu to dissuade
MacArthur from continuing to drive north. Instead, they chose to repeatedly warn the
American-led U.N. force about the potential consequences of their actions. When these
warnings went unheeded, the Chinese responded in the most effective way available to
them against a smaller but more modem military - they used surprise attacks to even the
odds.
Chinese Secrecy and Tactical Deceptions
Chinese secrecy and tactical deceptions played important roles in helping them to
achieve their operational surprise against MacArthur's forces. These painstaking efforts
were substantially more effective because U.S. intelligence forces were not focused on
Chinese operations and dismissed the piecemeal intelligence indicative of possible
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operations south of the Yalu River. Nevertheless, due credit must be given to veterans of
the PLA for the attention they paid to operational secrecy. First, the Chinese forces that
crossed the Yalu in mid-October moved on foot, only during the night, unaccompanied
by trucks or armored support. 28 Part of their astounding ability to move without
detection was an incredibly small logistics supply line. Max Hastings notes that
A Chinese soldier required just eight to ten pounds of supplies a day,
against sixty for his UN counterpart. Thus, to sustain fifty divisions in
combat, Peking needed to move only 2,500 tons of supplies a day south
across the Yalu. This compared with 600 tons for a single U.S. Army
division, 700 tons for the 1 st Marine Division.129
Once in Korea the CCF hid during the day in forests, caves, tunnels, farmhouses, or
whatever other cover was available. 3 0 Even the Chinese uniforms helped to camouflage
their units from overhead surveillance. One author notes that "their brown uniforms
matched the prevailing colour of the Korea environment - brown hills, brown villages -
and this made the troops difficult to detect. [Furthermore,] US reconnaissance aircraft
rarely concentrated their cameras on the high ground.'3 1 Thus, by the skillful use of
camouflage and cover, and avoiding areas of surveillance, the Chinese were able to slip
several hundred thousand soldiers into North Korea without being detected.
Even after the initial shock of their first phase of attacks in October of 1950, the
Chinese continued to use secrecy and tactical deception to great advantage. For example,
they halted wireless communication to avoid detection by the U.S. intelligence units.' 32
Admittedly, it is unclear whether the electronic emissions control was driven by a
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conscious decision by the Chinese military or the fact that they had very few radios. In
fact, bugles and verbal commands coordinated tactical movements and attacks. On the
other hand, the fact that the Chinese set forest fires in North Korea to serve as a
smokescreen whenever they had to move by daylight indicates that they were well aware
of the capabilities and limits of American intelligence.' 33 Furthermore, after the initial
surprise they continued to use irregular tactics to deceive U.N. forces. For example,
Bong Lee notes that sometimes "they even marched during daytime, pretending to be
ROKs, knowing that the airplanes would not be able to tell the difference."' 34 Thus,
through secrecy, camouflage and tactical deception, the Chinese were able to avoid
detection until the launch of their surprise attacks in November. It certainly helped that
U.N. and American forces were not actively looking for Chinese formations in the
highlands of North Korea.
American and U.N. Intelligence Failures
Despite the skillful use of secrecy by the Chinese, the operational surprise
inflicted on MacArthur's command in North Korea is the result of the American
intelligence failure to accurately estimate the Chinese capabilities and intentions in North
Korea. Several factors, including a dearth of intelligence collection resources, specious
conclusions from "mirror-imaging," and a callous dismissal of contrary evidence,
allowed the Chinese forces to remain hidden in the mountains of North Korea until their
ambush of the U.N. forces.
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MacArthur's command faced a huge challenge in collecting intelligence about the
Chinese. Partly, this stemmed from a lack of resources. For example, due to post-World
War II cutbacks, the Far East Air Force (FEAF) did not have a single expert qualified in
the art of photo interpretations and there were few accurate maps of North Korea with
which to compare aerial photographs.3 5 Consequently, when the Chinese set forest fires
to hide daytime troop movements their significance was not recognized by MacArthur's
command. Perhaps this would not have been an important indicator had they detected the
crossing of the Yalu by several hundred thousand Chinese soldiers. Unfortunately, due to
Chinese skill and American inattention the crossings went undetected. Restrictions on
aerial reconnaissance also hindered intelligence collection near the Manchurian border.
Richard Betts laments that "directives designed to reduce provocation of the Chinese also
reduced the intelligence collection capacity against them; reconnaissance beyond the
Yalu was prohibited and constrained even close to the border.' 36
Even when the Americans had good intelligence analysis it was ignored or
undercut by MacArthur and his intelligence staff who suffered from a belief that U.N.
victory was inevitable. For example, James M. Gavin, a famous airborne hero of World
War II, investigated Kimpo Airfield in Korea after its capture. He admits that he
was amazed to find an elaborate arrangement of hard stands and
revetments all around the airfield. They were as good or better than any I
had seen in the airfields of Europe in World War II. Obviously, some
sophisticated thinking had gone into the planning, and much labor and
effort had been expended in anticipation of using the airfield by a modem
air force. Either the North Koreans were wasting their time, which
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seemed unlikely, or a first class air power was about to intervene in the
war. 137
Willoughby dismissed this discovery as unimportant. Since the Chinese were not a major
air power perhaps this is understandable. On the other hand, it could suggest that the
North Koreans believed they might receive airplanes or other aid from the Soviets, or
perhaps from the Chinese acting as their proxy.
After the North Korean invasion, the United States also had difficulty
reconstituting the spy networks it had run under its occupation a few years earlier. 38
This too, limited the amount of useful information flowing to the military leadership.
Had General MacArthur or the Joint Chiefs of Staff any inkling of Chinese involvement,
it might have given them pause. Had they known that nearly half a million Chinese
soldiers were pouring across the Yalu, it seems likely that they have altered their strategy,
perhaps holding at the more easily defended "neck" of the Korean Peninsula.
Intelligence collection was not the only problem that plagued U.S. decision-
making in the Korean War. It appears that both American civilian and military
leadership fell into the trap of "mirror-imaging" - the process by which one assesses an
enemy's intentions based upon one's own assumptions. This can be a very dangerous
mistake, particularly when both sides do not share the same assumptions. For example,
after the Inchon landing it did not appear logical or reasonable to General MacArthur,
MacArthur's Intelligence chief General Willoughby, Acheson or others that China would
intervene on North Korea's behalf. Most believed that if the Chinese had sent forces
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while the U.S. forces were on the ropes they might have succeeded in driving them from
the peninsula. Once the North Koreans had been crushed, however, the Chinese would
have to do the majority of the fighting themselves to save the North Korean communists.
In retrospect, this seems an ironic position to have held because only six months earlier
the U.S. had intervened on behalf of the South Koreans under very similar circumstances.
Perhaps the best example of this vein of thinking is revealed in General Willoughby's Far
East Command Daily Intelligence Summary of October 28th, 1950. He notes that
From a tactical viewpoint, with victorious U.S. divisions in full
deployment, it would appear that the auspicious time for [Chinese]
intervention has long since passed; it is difficult to believe that such a
move, if planned, would have been postponed to a time when remnant
North Korea forces have been reduced to a low point of effectiveness. 1 39
MacArthur himself had personally conveyed the same assessment to President Truman
during their meeting on Wake Island in September. Even then, MacArthur asserted that
there was very little chance of Soviet or Chinese intervention because
Had they interfered in the first or second months it would have been
decisive. We are no longer fearful of their intervention. We no longer
stand hat in hand. The Chinese have 300,000 men in Manchuria. Of these
not more than 100/125,000 are distributed along the Yalu River. They
have no air force. Now that we have our own Air Force in Korea, if the
Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang there would be the greatest
slaughter." 14 0
Importantly, the American intelligence community did not contradict these attitudes
because at the time it was believed that the Soviets controlled their "client states" and
would not risk another world war by allowing the Chinese to engage American forces.'41
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The CIA prepared nine intelligence estimates on the likelihood of Chinese
intervention in October but stressed that although the Chinese could intervene it was
unlikely that they would. 42 It should be noted that while a CIA report did state that
400,000 Chinese troops had moved to the Korean border and ordered to cross around
October 18 th, the same report downplayed its significance by noting that "the optimum
time for such action has passed."' 4 3 The U.S. Army Chief of Staff later admitted that the
consensus opinion in the intelligence community was that the Chinese were bluffing and
that the threat "probably covered a less drastic plan of action."'44 One notable exception
to this consensus was Edmund Chubb, Director of Chinese Affairs in the State
Department. Chubb was convinced that China would intervene but his "persistent
pessimism on the issue undermined his credibility."' 4 5 Since MacArthur and the senior
members of the Truman administration dismissed a Chinese intervention as unlikely,
dissenting views were largely ignored.
This failure to accurately predict the Chinese intentions or detect their movement
into North Korea was a grievous mistake. It was understandably easy to dismiss the
threat of the Chinese People's Liberation Army because it
had few tanks and no heavy artillery, air force, atom bomb, or capability,
to mount operations combining land, sea, and air arms...These obvious
weaknesses were not conducive to leading General MacArthur, the
Pentagon, or the State Department to take seriously the danger signals of
the Chinese Communist threat to intervene in Korea.' 4 6
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What MacArthur, the JCS, and the State Department did not understand was the
importance the Chinese placed upon securing their border and standing up to the United
States. After the war, General Willoughby questioned whether it was reasonable to
believe that
Communist China [was] prepared to take the stunning gamble of throwing
its forces into war against a country possessing the atom bomb and
complete air control of the campaign area? Could she afford to risk the
destruction of her flimsy industrial base and the severance of her tenuous
supply lines from the Soviets, which would deny her the resources to
support modem war or to sustain large military forces in the field and in
turn weaken the Peiping Communist government's hold in Asia as to
threaten the eventuality of a Red debacle?' 4 7
Aside from underestimating the strength of Mao's regime, it is obvious that Willoughby
could not imagine the advantages that could accrue to the Chinese forces by their initial
use of surprise attacks in North Korea. By ambushing the U.N. forces the Chinese
slowed their headlong advance towards the Yalu, forced them into fixed positions, tested
their vaunted military capabilities, and assessed whether further attacks would draw
retaliatory nuclear strikes on Chinese cities. 48
Once MacArthur and his command had decided it was too late for effective
Chinese intervention only massive, indisputable evidence of massive Chinese forces
would have forced a reassessment. For example, in October General Paik Sun Yup of the
ROK 1St Division examined Chinese corpses and estimated he faced a ten thousand
strong Chinese division.149 On October 29 th, the 26th ROK Regiment identified 16 POWs
of the 124th CCF Division. They concluded ominously that the
147 James McGovern, To the Yalu: From the Chinese Invasion of Korea to MacArthur's Dismissal (New
York: William Morrow & Company, Inc.; 1972), 85.
148 James McGovern, To the Yalu: From the Chinese Invasion of Korea to MacArthur's Dismissal (New
York: William Morrow & Company, Inc.; 1972), 86.
149 James McGovern, To the Yalu: From the Chinese Invasion of Korea to MacArthur's Dismissal (New
York: William Morrow & Company, Inc.; 1972), 52.
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CCF has decided to intervene in the Korean War. [And] that this
reinforcement is being effected by unit rather than piecemeal replacement
from volunteer cadres. However, until more definite information is
obtained it must be presumed that the CCF has not decided on full scale
intervention...The advantages to be gained by all-out intervention, at a
time when the NK forces are on the verge of complete collapse, is not
readily apparent. 5 0
MacArthur's intelligence chief, General Willoughby dismissed the importance of these
contacts by characterizing the Chinese as "stragglers."'5 1 Then on November 1 st, an
American marine battalion in X Corps and a unit of the 1st Cavalry Division found
themselves in fierce firefights along the Chongchon River, after which the Chinese broke
contact and melted away into the hills.' 52 MacArthur described the situation as "not
alarming." 53 Ultimately, it would take days of relentless assaults and ambushes
beginning on Thanksgiving night to convince MacArthur that the war had fundamentally
changed. Still, it seems clear that the warnings from Beijing, coupled with Chinese
corpses and large well-known troop concentrations in Manchuria should have persuaded
MacArthur and his subordinates to act with some caution in their headlong advance
towards the Yalu, instead of the second phase of Chinese attacks in late November.
Conclusion
The Chinese achieved operational surprise in the Korean War because of their
zealous attention to operational secrecy, and, more importantly, the failure of American
military and intelligence to accurately estimate the capabilities and intentions their
150 James McGovern, To the Yalu: From the Chinese Invasion of Korea to MacArthur's Dismissal (New
York: William Morrow & Company, Inc.; 1972), 64.
151 Bong Lee, The Unfinished War: Korea (New York: Algora Publishing; 2003), 154.
152 William Manchester, American Caesar (Boston: Little, Brown and Company; 1978), 601.
153 William Manchester, American Caesar (Boston: Little, Brown and Company; 1978), 601.
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enemy. The United States lacked enough intelligence resources to perform sufficient
aerial reconnaissance in the North Korean theater of operations. The inability of the U.S.
to assemble a spy network in North Korea or China limited the amount of tactical
information that MacArthur's command received. Finally, MacArthur and his
intelligence officers discounted a series of warnings and mounting evidence of Chinese
involvement because it did not seem logical to them.
Despite being seriously concerned with the possibility of Chinese intervention,
the Truman administration and MacArthur failed to heed the warning messages and
signals indicating preparations for an attack. Max Hastings describes this operational
surprise best when he writes
It was an extraordinary achievement of modern warfare. Between October
13 and 25 the intelligence staffs of MacArthur's armies failed to discern
the slightest evidence of the movement of 130,000 soldiers and porters. A
combination of superb fieldcraft and camouflage by the Chinese, with
their lack of use of any of the conventional means of detecting modern
military movement - wireless traffic, mechanized activity, supply dumps -
blinded the UN command to what was taking place on its front. Above
all, the generals were not looking for anything of this sort. They had
persuaded themselves that war was all but over. Their senses were
deadened to any fresh perception.' 5 4
Once again, one can see the hubris of military leadership emerge when victory is near
causing them to discount unfavorable information and subject their forces to the risk of
an unexpected attack.
Certainly, the failure to investigate Chou En-lai's warnings or devote more
resources to the Chinese forces assembling in Manchuria was inexcusable. This occurred
simply because MacArthur and his command believed that they could achieve afait
'54 Max Hastings, The Korean War (New York: Simon & Schuster; 1987), 137.
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accompli and secure the Korean peninsula before China could intervene successfully.
Harvey DeWeerd laments that MacArthur's command
refused to believe our intelligence [in 1950] because it would have been
very inconvenient...we would have had to do something about it. In the
end .. it was more convenient not to have believed.. .but those acquainted
with statecraft and politics know how much easier it is to rectify an error
of omission, even at tremendous cost, than to make an embarrassing
decision in advance. 155
Given MacArthur's personality, only direct and unambiguous intelligence of Chinese
movements might have forced a change in his strategy.
What that change might have been no one can say with any certainty. The British
had advocated stopping the advance a the narrow 'neck' of the peninsula to assuage
Chinese fears and allow the UN forces to occupy an easily defended stretch of ground.
Naturally, this meant ceding the northernmost part of Korea to China or as a haven to
Kim Il Sung and his followers. Of this advice MacArthur had nothing but contempt as he
demonstrated when he remarked that
the widely reported British desire to appease the Chinese Communists by
giving them a strip of North Korea finds it historic precedent in the action
taken at Munich on September 29, 1938...To give up any portion of North
Korea to the aggression of the Chinese Communists would be the greatest
defeat of the free world in recent times. Indeed, to yield to so immoral a
proposition would bankrupt our leadership and influence in Asia, and
render untenable our position both politically and morally. 56
It seems unlikely that MacArthur could have been reined in without a complete victory,
but perhaps his strategy might have changed. Perhaps the 8th Army and the X Corps
would have advanced more warily, improving roads, caching supply dumps and bringing
155 DeWeerd, "Strategic Surprise in the Korean War," 451-452. As cited in Richard Betts, Surprise Attack:
Lessonsfor Defense Planning (Washington, D.C.: Brookings; 1982), 108.
156 U.S. National Archive, FR7:1108-9. As cited in Max Hastings, The Korean War (New York: Simon &
Schuster; 1987), 126.
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forward field hospitals in order to better prepare for the coming fight with the Chinese
forces. Ultimately, had the Chinese surprise attack been blunted or parried, perhaps the
stalemate along the 38th Parallel that continues to this day could have been avoided.
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CONCLUSION:
INTELLIGENCE FAILURE AND
OPERATIONAL SURPRISE ATTACKS
We are never deceived; we deceive ourselves.
- Johann Wolfgang Von Goethe
The losses and setbacks sustained by American forces as a result of operational
surprise attacks in the Battle of the Bulge and the Chinese counteroffensive in the Korean
War highlight the importance of understanding the interplay of secrecy, deception and
intelligence failure. These cases demonstrate that while operational secrecy and strategic
deception are important to the successful execution of a surprise attack, poor intelligence
collection, analysis and dissemination are necessary elements. In each case, the
American-led forces believed their enemies to be nearly defeated and dismissed the
possibility of an attack as implausible. In addition to inaccurately estimating the
intentions and capabilities of their enemies, American intelligence officers made
inadequate attempts to understand conflicting intelligence that did not fit with their
optimistic mindset. The secrecy and deception operations practiced by the Germans and
Chinese, however, did play an important role in allowing the incorrect presumptions to
stand unchallenged. After reviewing these cases and the intelligence that was collected it
appears that only direct and unambiguous information would have altered the Americans'
assessment of their respective situations.
Some scholars argue that this failure to sufficiently challenge one's perceptions
and beliefs with contrary evidence is 'essential to the logic of inquiry' and human
cognitive processes. Robert Jervis and others have commented that
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The evidence from both psychology and history overwhelmingly supports
the view...that decision-makers tend to fit incoming information into their
existing theories and images. Indeed, their theories and images play a
large part in determining what they notice. In other words, actors tend to
perceive what they expect. Furthermore... a theory will have a greater
impact on an actor's interpretation of data the greater the ambiguity of the
data and the higher degree of confidence with which the actor holds the
theory.' 57
Moreover, it requires "more, and more unambiguous, information for an actor to
recognize the an unexpected phenomenon than an expected one.158 This explains the
power of secrecy and deception. Both elements reinforce the existing beliefs and wishful
thinking of the intended victim.
Despite this natural fallibility of generals and their intelligence staff when
prosecuting a successful military campaign, some information always exists that indicates
preparations for a major operation. For example, in both cases intelligence existed about
massive troop concentrations in the Schnee Eifel (Germans) and in Manchuria (Chinese).
That this intelligence was ignored or explained away, without seriously challenging the
existing estimates of the intentions and capabilities of the enemy, directly contributed to
both cases of surprise attack. That is not to say that all battlefield intelligence is equally
important or accurate. Clausewitz rightly dismisses the maxim that "we should only
believe reliable intelligence and should never cease to be suspicious" because "many
intelligence reports in war are contradictory, even more are false, and most are
uncertain.. ." 59
157 Floyd Allport, Theories of Perception and the Concept of Structure (New York 1955), 382; Ole Holsti,
"Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy," in David Finlay, Ole Holsti, and Richard Fagen, Enemies
in Politics (Chicago 1967), 70 as cited in Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," World Politics,
Vol. 20, No. 3 (April, 1968), 455-456.
158 Robert Jervis., "Hypotheses on Misperception," World Politics, Vol. 20, No. 3 (April, 1968), 456.
159 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton
University Press; 1976), 117.
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The conclusion from this analysis of the Battle of the Bulge and the Chinese
counteroffensive across the Yalu, however, is that it is critical to remain wary of an
enemy whose military capacity to resist appears to be low. Evidence contrary to this
perception should be carefully considered and the disposition of one's own forces must
enable a commander to respond immediately to contain and rollback an attempted
surprise attack. It is important to ensure that the intelligence is used to estimate an
enemy's intentions and capabilities, rather than estimating an enemy's strength (or lack
thereof) and explaining away or ignoring conflicting evidence. Commanders must strive
to obtain sufficient all-source intelligence resources, prioritize collection targets, consult
experienced analysts and share intelligence estimates between headquarters and field
units. After assembling all the intelligence the military leadership must take special care
to examine and review evidence that challenges their assumptions about their enemy. In
this way, the deleterious effects of operational surprise attacks might be avoided or
lessened.
Future, studies on this topic might include additional case studies as well as a
statistical study of surprise attacks. Case studies that include two or more near-peer
competitors such as the Iran-Iraq War, the Arab-Israeli conflicts of the 1960's and 70's,
the Tet Offensive in Vietnam may prove useful to test whether these findings hold true
for other situations. Large amphibious assaults such as those carried out at Normandy
and Inchon might yield important insights about surprise attacks due to their high success
rate. A statistical analysis of modem wars from World War II to the present might prove
useful for discovering the frequency of attempts at operational surprise attacks. There
might be a correlation between percent of territorial losses or casualties and the
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likelihood of a country resorting to a surprise attack. A more precise casualty exchange
ratio could also be calculated to determine the advantage that accrues to the attacking
country.
Leaving aside those questions for future research, this thesis has attempted to
identify and define operational surprise attacks - a type of surprise attack that has hitherto
been largely overlooked by military theorists. By examining the Battle of the Bulge and
the Chinese counterattack in the Korean War it is possible to analyze the interplay and
relative contributions of secrecy, deception, and intelligence failure in these operational
surprise attacks. In these cases when victory was believed near, operational surprise
attacks were successfully executed because one country severely underestimated its
enemy. Furthermore, these attacks are unexpectedly effective precisely because the
victim does not believe its enemy has the remaining resources to challenge it.
Nevertheless, the conclusion that the flaw is internal to a country's own military is
inherently optimistic, because it means that the fault can be rectified without influence or
cooperation firom one's enemies. By altering collection, analysis and communication of
intelligence contrary to the prevailing assumption of the enemy it may be possible to
reduce the possibility of future surprise attacks. Indeed, should the United States
continue to conduct global military interventions, the American military and intelligence
community would do well to remember this historical lesson before China or Iran has the
opportunity to remind them.
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